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1 Introduction
The one–sector growth model has become the workhorse of modern macroeconomics. The
popularity of the one–sector growth model is at least partly due to the fact that it captures in a
minimalist fashion the essence of modern economic growth, which Kuznets (1973) in his No-
bel prize lecture described as the sustained increase in productivity and living standards. By
virtue of being a minimalist structure, the one–sector growth model necessarily abstracts from
several features of the process of economic growth. One of these is the process of structural
transformation, that is, the reallocation of economic activity across the broad sectors agricul-
ture, manufacturing and services. Kuznets listed structural transformation as one of the six
main features of modern economic growth. Structural transformation has also received a lot
of attention in the policy debate of developed countries where various observers have claimed
that the sectoral reallocation of economic activity is inefficient, and calls for government in-
tervention. Understanding whether structural transformation arises as an efficient equilibrium
outcome requires enriching the one–sector growth model to incorporate multiple sectors. More
generally, this raises the question whether incorporating multiple sectors will sharpen or expand
the insights that can be obtained from the one–sector growth model. Several researchers have
recently begun to tackle these questions, and the objective of this chapter is to synthesize and
evaluate their efforts.1
The first step in the broad line of research on structural transformation is to develop exten-
sions of the one–sector growth model that are consistent with the “stylized facts” of structural
transformation. Accordingly, we begin this chapter by presenting the stylized facts of structural
transformation and then develop a multi–sector extension of the growth model that serves as a
natural benchmark model to address the issue of structural transformation. Given the promi-
nent role attributed to theories of balanced growth in the literature using the one–sector growth
model, we start by asking whether it is possible to simultaneously deliver structural transfor-
mation and balanced growth. Recent work has identified several versions of the growth model
that achieve this, and we present the results of this work in the context of our benchmark multi–
1A different aspect of structural transformation that Kuznets also noted is the movement of the population from
rural into urban areas, which is typically accompanied by the movement of employment out of agriculture.
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sector model.
It turns out that the conditions under which one can simultaneously generate balanced
growth and structural transformation are rather strict, and that under these conditions the multi–
sector model is not able to account for the broad set of empirical regularities that characterize
structural transformation. We therefore argue that the literature on structural transformation has
possibly placed too much attention on requiring exact balanced growth, and that it would be bet-
ter served by settling for approximate balanced growth instead. Put somewhat differently, we
think that progress in building better models of structural transformation will come from focus-
ing on the forces behind structural transformation without insisting on exact balanced growth.
While the corresponding efforts to uncover the forces behind structural transformation are rel-
atively recent, we describe some headway that has been made. We argue that the recent work
suggests that the benchmark multi–sector model with approximate balanced growth is able to
account for many salient features of structural transformation for the US, both qualitatively and
quantitatively.
Armed with an extension of the one–sector growth model that incorporates structural trans-
formation in an empirically reasonable fashion, we seek to answer the question of whether mod-
eling structural transformation indeed delivers new or sharper insights into issues of interest.
We argue that the answer to this question is yes, and we present several specific examples from
the literature to illustrate this. These examples have in common that taking into account changes
in the sectoral composition of the economy is crucial for understanding a variety of changes in
aggregate outcomes. As we will see, this applies to important issues concerning economic
development, regional income convergence, aggregate productivity trends, hours worked, busi-
ness cycles, and wage inequality.2
2Matsuyama (2008) and Ray (2010) also review the literature on structural transformation (or structural change,
as Ray calls it). In contrast to them, we devote a large part of our review to documenting the stylized facts
of structural transformation and to assessing whether multi–sector extensions of the standard growth model can
account for them. Greenwood and Seshadri (2005) review the literature on economic transformation, which refers
to broader issues than structural transformation, for example changes in the patterns of fertility and the movement
of women out of the household into the labor market.
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2 The Stylized Facts of Structural Transformation
As mentioned in the introduction, structural transformation is defined as the reallocation of
economic activity across three broad sectors (agriculture, manufacturing, and services) that ac-
companies the process of modern economic growth.3 In this section, we present the stylized
facts of structural transformation. While a sizeable literature on the topic already exists, in-
cluding the notable early contributions of Clark (1957), Chenery (1960), Kuznets (1966), and
Syrquin (1988),4 we think that improvements in the quality of previous data and the appearance
of new data sets make it worthwhile for us to summarize the current state of evidence.
Because the process of structural transformation continues throughout development, it is
desirable to document its properties using relatively long time series for individual countries.
The early studies that we cited above attempted to do this. However, the authors of these
studies typically had to piece together data from various sources, necessarily creating issues
about the comparability of their results across time and countries. In addition, the time period
for which data was available was still relatively short. Recent efforts by various researchers to
reconstruct historical data have increased the availability of appropriate long time series data for
the purposes of documenting structural transformation. Although one still has to piece together
data from different sources to generate long time series for most countries, time coverage has
improved and compatibility is much less of a problem than it was in the past. We are going to
use the Historical National Accounts Database of the University of Groningen as our primary
historical data source, which we complement with several other data sources to increase the
length of the periods covered.5
While it is conceptually desirable to examine changes for individual countries over long
time series, and there is now more opportunity to do so, limiting attention to individual coun-
tries narrows the perspective unnecessarily. To begin with, it effectively restricts the set of
3We follow much of the literature and use the term manufacturing in this context to refer to all activity that
falls outside of agriculture and services. It might seem to be more appropriate to refer to this category as industry,
because manufacturing is just the largest component of it, but we prefer to reserve the term “industry” to refer to
a generic production category.
4The list of subsequent papers is too large for us to attempt to include it in its entirety.
5Appendix A contains a detailed description about the historical data sources that we use. Many of them are
also underlying the recent historical studies by Dennis and Iscan (2009) about structural transformation in the
United States and by Alvarez–Cuadrado and Poschke (2011) about structural transformation in twelve industrial-
ized countries including the United States.
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countries that can be studied to those that are currently rich, and so it leaves open the ques-
tion of whether currently poor countries show the same regularities that currently rich countries
showed when they were poor a century or two ago. Limiting attention to long time series data
has the additional disadvantage that despite major improvements in constructing historical time
series, they typically do not reach the quality of the best data sets for recent years. Therefore,
we document the regularities of structural transformation also for five data sets that cover a
relatively large set of developing and developed countries during the last thirty or so years: the
Benchmark Studies of the International Comparisons Program as reported by the Penn World
Table (PWT), EU KLEMS, the National Accounts from the United Nations Statistics Division,
the OECD Consumption Expenditure Data, and the World Development Indicators (WDI).6
2.1 Measures of Structural Transformation
Before presenting any data, it is useful to briefly note some aspects of measuring economic
development and structural transformation.
The two most common measures of economic development at the aggregate level are GDP
per capita and some measure of productivity (typically GDP per worker or GDP per hour,
depending upon data availability), each expressed in international dollars. While these two
measures often coincide, there are cases in which they differ. For example, several European
economies have similar values of GDP per hour as the US, but GDP per capita can be as much
as 25 percent lower than in the US because hours per adult are much lower. Without knowing
the exact context of the issue being addressed, it is unclear whether one should categorize these
European countries as equally or less developed than the United States.
Having raised this issue, in this chapter we choose to always measure the level of devel-
opment by GDP per capita in 1990 international $. Three reasons motivate this choice. First,
in order to be able to identify threshold effects and the like, we insist on the comparability of
the GDP numbers across different data sets, and GDP per capita is the only measure that is
available for most countries and most of the time. Second, the standard models of structural
6We again refer the reader to Appendix A for the details regarding the data sets and how we use them to
construct measures of economic activity at the sector level.
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transformation take labor supply to be exogenous, implying that they abstract from differences
in hours worked. Third, since some of the models that we will consider emphasize the role of
income effects for structural transformation, it seems appropriate to characterize the patterns of
sectoral reallocation conditional on income. Irrespective of these three reasons for using GDP
per capita, we emphasize that most of our figures would look similar if instead we used one of
the productivity measures when they are available.
We now turn to measuring structural transformation. The three most common measures of
economic activity at the sectoral level are employment shares, value added shares, and final
consumption expenditure shares. Employment shares are calculated either by using workers
or hours worked by sector, depending on data availability. Value added shares and final con-
sumption expenditure shares are typically expressed in current prices (“nominal shares”), but
they may be expressed in constant prices also (“real shares”). While there is a tendency in the
literature to view the different measures as interchangeable when documenting how economic
activity is reallocated across sectors over time, one of the issues that we want to emphasize in
this chapter is that they are in fact distinct. In particular, as we will discuss in detail later on, it
is critical to be aware of the distinctions among the different measures when doing quantitative
work because even when they display the same qualitative behavior, the quantitative implica-
tions may be quite different. Moreover, there are some striking cases in which they display
differences even in the qualitative behavior.
Probably the most important reason for the differences between the measures of structural
transformation is that employment shares and value added shares are related to production
whereas final consumption expenditure shares are related to consumption. Production and con-
sumption measures may display different behaviors because value added is not the same as final
output.
A simple example will help to illustrate the distinction between value added and final goods
that is relevant here. Consider the purchase of a cotton shirt from a retail establishment. Because
the cotton shirt is a “good” as opposed to a “service”, in terms of final consumption expenditure,
the entire expenditure will be measured as final consumption expenditure of the manufacturing
sector. However, in terms of value added in production, the same purchase will be broken down
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into three pieces: a component from the agricultural sector (i.e., the cotton that was used in
making the shirt), a component from the manufacturing sector (i.e., the processing of the cotton
and the production of the shirt), and a component from the service sector (i.e., the distribution
and retail trade services where the shirt was purchased).
The end result of this is that although the same sectoral labels are used when disaggregat-
ing GDP into value added and final expenditure, the resulting measures of sectoral shares are
conceptually distinct. It follows that both quantities and prices may differ between value added
and final expenditure, implying that there is no reason to expect the implied shares to exhibit
similar behavior. This will be of particular relevance when connecting models of structural
transformation to the data, which we will discuss in detail below.
The previous discussion emphasized the difference between production and consumption
measures. However, even the two measures that focus on production might contain different
information. One example comes from Kuznets (1966), who showed for the early part of US
development that the employment share of services increased considerably at the same time
that the value added share of services remained almost constant.
Having emphasized that each of the three measures of economic activity at the sectoral level
is distinct, we also want to note that each of them has its limitations as a singular measure. For
the case of sectoral employment shares, a key issue is that employment may not reflect changes
in “true” labor input, for example, because there are systematic differences in hours worked or
in human capital per worker across sectors that vary with the level of development. For the
case of value added and consumption expenditure shares, a key issue arises from the need to
distinguish between changes in quantities and prices. This is often difficult empirically because
reliable data on relative price comparisons across countries are hard to come by. In addition,
consumption and production need not coincide because of the presence of investment and of
imports and exports, so that neither measure alone is sufficient.
2.2 Production Measures of Structural Transformation
In this subsection we document the patterns of structural transformation based on examining
production measures in several different data sets. We first review the available historical time
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Figure 1: Sectoral Shares of Employment and Value Added –
Selected Developed Countries 1800–2000
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series evidence for currently rich economies. We then turn to the evidence for currently rich
and poor countries.
2.2.1 Evidence from Long Time Series for Currently Rich Countries
We construct individual time series of sectoral employment shares and value added shares over
the 19th and 20th century for the following ten countries: Belgium, Finland, France, Japan,
Korea, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States.7 Since the early data is
sketchy and we want to highlight trends over long periods of time, we report the latest available
observation for each decade, if any. We note that for these historical time series we only have
measures based on production.
Figure 1 plots the historical time series. The vertical axis is either the share of employment
or the share of value added in current prices in the three broad sectors of interest. The horizontal
axis is the log of GDP per capita in 1990 international dollars as reported by Maddison. The
figures clearly reveal what the literature views as the stylized facts of structural transformation.
Over the last two centuries, increases in GDP per capita have been associated with decreases
in both the employment share and the nominal value added share in agriculture, and increases
in both the employment share and the nominal value added share in services. Manufacturing
has behaved differently from the other two sectors: its employment and nominal value added
shares follow a hump shape, that is, they are increasing for lower levels of development and
decreasing for higher levels of development.
Figure 1 reveals several additional regularities that have been somewhat less appreciated in
the context of structural transformation. First, focusing on the agricultural sector, we can see
that for low levels of development the value added share is considerably lower than the em-
ployment share. This finding is interesting in light of the fact that countries which are currently
poor tend to have most of their workers in agriculture although agriculture is the least produc-
tive sector.8 Second, focusing on the service sector, we see that both the employment share
and the nominal value added share for the service sector are bounded away from zero even at
very low levels of development; the lowest value added share of services is around 20% and the
7For a detailed description of the data sources, see the Appendix A.
8See Caselli (2005) and Restuccia et al. (2008) for evidence on this point.
9
lowest employment share is around 10%.9 Third, the figure for the nominal value added share
in services suggests that there is an acceleration in the rate of increase when the log of GDP per
capita reaches around 9.10 Inspecting the graphs for the other two nominal value added shares
more closely, we also note that the nominal value added share for manufacturing peaks around
the same log GDP at which the nominal value added share for the service sector accelerates,
and so it appears that the accelerated increase in the value added share of services coincides
with the onset of the decrease in the nominal value added share for manufacturing sector.11
2.2.2 Evidence from Recent Panels for Currently Rich and Poor Countries
We now turn to an examination of production measures from several more recent data sets,
which tend to be of higher quality than the historical data and which include also countries that
are currently poor as well as additional variables (nominal versus real, hours versus employ-
ment). The goal of this subsection is to assess the stylized facts of structural transformation that
we documented for the historical data, as well as to take advantage of the richer data available
so as to examine additional dimensions of structural transformation.
Evidence from EU KLEMS
We start with EU KLEMS, which is compiled at the Groningen Growth and Development
Center. The primary strength of EU KLEMS in documenting patterns in employment and value
added shares is that it has the most complete information for all variables of interest, including
sectoral hours worked, and that its value added data have been constructed from the national
accounts of individual countries following a harmonized procedure that aims to ensure cross–
country comparability.12 The primary weakness of EU KLEMS is that its coverage is limited to
countries with relatively high income; South Korea during the early 1970s is the country with
9This finding is confirmed by the historical study of Broadberry et al. (2011), who present evidence for England
during the 14th century that the employment share of services was around 20%.
10See Buera and Kaboski (2012a, 2012b) for additional evidence on this point in a larger cross section of
countries.
11While we do not develop this issue further here, Buera and Kaboski (2012b) also show that at low levels of
GDP per capita the manufacturing sector expands more quickly than does the service sector.
12For example, a common industry classification was used and price indices were constructed in a similar way
across countries). For more detail see O’Mahony and Timmer (2009) and Timmer et al. (2010).
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Figure 2: Sectoral Shares of Hours Worked and Nominal Value Added –
5 Non–EU Countries and Aggregate of 15 EU Countries from EU KLEMS 1970–2007
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Figure 3: Sectoral Shares of Hours Worked and Nominal Value Added –
15 EU countries from EU KLEMS 1970–2007
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the lowest income in the sample.
We first document the evolution of the shares of sectoral hours worked and nominal value
added as functions of the level of development for five non–European countries – i.e., Aus-
tralia, Canada, Japan, Korea and the United States – as well as for the aggregate of fifteen
EU countries.13 The data are plotted in Figure 2. The vertical axis is either the share of total
hours worked or the share of value added in current prices in the three broad sectors of interest.
As before, the horizontal axis is the log of GDP per capita in 1990 international dollars from
Maddison.
The plots in Figure 2 confirm several patterns from the historical times series. First, the
shares of hours worked and nominal value added for agriculture tend to decrease with the level
of development for all countries, whereas the shares for services tend to increase with the
level of development for all countries. Second, taken as a whole, the data are consistent with
a hump shape for the shares in the manufacturing sector, although all countries except for
Korea have decreasing manufacturing shares. Third, the series for both shares as a function
of GDP per capita are quite consistent across countries. That is, not only are the qualitative
patterns very similar, but so too are the quantitative patterns. This is of particular interest given
the considerable attention that has been placed on the role of openness in the growth miracle
of Korea (Korea liberalized its manufacturing trade starting in the 1960s and became one of
the most open countries in the world). Although to a lesser extent, one could make similar
statements for the case of Japan.
Although this last finding might tempt one to conclude that openness is not a quantita-
tively important determinant of sectoral allocations and structural transformation, we do want
to caution the reader against jumping too quickly to this conclusion. Figure 3 shows the same
series separately for the 15 EU countries. Although all countries display the same qualitative
patterns, there is now substantial heterogeneity in the cross section at any given level of devel-
opment. This is consistent with the view that these countries form a fairly integrated free–trade
zone, thereby allowing for a high degree of specialization, and significant differences in how
13These are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
13
economic activity is allocated across broad sectors.14
Next, we turn our attention to possible differences between real and nominal shares of sec-
toral value added, where nominal refers to current prices and real refers to constant prices.
Kuznets (1966) concluded that the early available data showed similar qualitative patterns for
nominal and real shares. We revisit this comparison because EU KLEMS has more recent and
higher quality data than were available to Kuznets. Figure 4 plots the real shares of sectoral
value added in the left panel and, for comparison, the nominal shares from Figure 2 in the right
panel. The plots show that the qualitative patterns of real and nominal value added shares are
fairly similar to each other, confirming what Kuznets found for the earlier data.
One important exception is Korea where the manufacturing share rose to half of real value
added, which is considerably higher than in the other countries on the graph. At the same
time, the manufacturing share of nominal value added flattened out around the maximum share
for the other countries. Moreover, the real service share remained below the service share of
the other countries, and actually fell somewhat. At the same time, the nominal service share
stayed mostly flat. These observations imply that the price of manufacturing relative to total
value added fell by more in Korea than in the other countries. This is consistent with the view
that during Korea’s massive trade liberalization the relative price of manufactured goods fell
considerably at the same time as the real growth rate of manufacturing increased considerably.15
Evidence from the WDI and the UN Statistics Division
As previously noted, the main shortcoming of both the historical data and of EU KLEMS is that
the coverage is limited to countries that have fairly high income today. It is therefore of interest
to verify whether the stylized facts of structural transformation extend to data sets that cover
countries that are poor today. The two obvious data sets to use in this context are the World
Development Indicators (WDI) and the National Accounts that the United Nations Statistics
Division collects.
We use the WDI for employment by sector, which it reports since 1980 based on the data
14Some of the series that we consider later on in this section will reveal differences between Korea and the other
countries.
15Looking at sectoral employment shares, Bah (2008) documents that the process of structural transformation
in many developing countries also looks different than the historical experiences of current rich countries.
14
Figure 4: Sectoral Shares of Real and Nominal Value Added –
5 Non–EU Countries and Aggregate of 15 EU Countries from EU KLEMS 1970–2007
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published by the International Labor Organization (ILO). We emphasize that these data are
about employed workers instead of hours worked and are of considerably lower quality than
those in EU KLEMS because there is much less harmonization underlying the construction
of WDI data, which leads to comparability issues. Moreover, WDI employment data are not
uniformly available over time for all countries. We use the national accounts of the United
Nations Statistics Division for value added by sector. Unlike the WDI, the UN Statistics Divi-
sion provides continuous coverage for a large number of countries between 1970 and 2007 and
makes an explicit effort to harmonize the national accounts data so as to ensure that they are
comparable across different countries.
Figure 5 plots the sectoral employment shares from the WDI against GDP per capita from
Maddison. The plots confirm that in terms of sectoral employment shares the basic qualitative
regularities of structural transformation also hold outside the set of rich countries for which
EU KLEMS has data. Specifically, it is the case again that the agricultural employment share
decreases in the level of development and that the employment share of services increases in the
level of development. Moreover, the employment share in manufacturing is strongly increasing
at lower levels of development (log of GDP per worker smaller than 9) before flattening out and
then decreasing somewhat for higher levels of development. While this pattern is consistent
with a hump shape, we note that the downward sloping part is not very pronounced in the WDI
data.
Not surprisingly, the plots also show that employment shares do take on much more extreme
values than can be found in EU KLEMS. For example, now the employment share of agriculture
can be as high as 70% percent and the employment shares of manufacturing and services can
be as low as only 10%. Lastly, for a given level of development the plots show much greater
variability in the employment shares relative to what we found in the EU KLEMS data. The
extent to which this simply reflects greater measurement error due to lack of comparability and
other factors is an open question.
Figure 6 plots nominal value added shares by sector from the UN Statistics Division against
GDP per capita from Maddison. Since these data have complete coverage for many rich and
poor countries, they come close to a balanced panel. We therefore also plot the fitted nominal
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Figure 5: Sectoral Shares of Employment –
Cross Sections from the WDI 1980–2000
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Figure 6: Sectoral Shares of Nominal Value Added –
Cross Sections from UN National Accounts 1975–2005
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value added shares from panel regressions. This is intended as a way of summarizing some
patterns in the data, instead of as a way of testing any theory. For each sector we regress nom-
inal value added shares on country fixed effects and the level, square, and cube of GDP per
worker.16 We include countries for which no observations are missing, which were not commu-
nist, and which had more than a million inhabitants during 1970–2007. Details regarding the
construction of the panel of countries and the regression results are contained in Appendix B.
The fitted curves reveal the same qualitative patterns that we have documented previously.
It is of particular interest that the hump shape clearly emerges for manufacturing value added.
Moreover, it is of interest that the fitted curve for services indicates an acceleration of the
service share when the log of GDP per capita reaches a threshold value around 9 and the share
of manufacturing value added peaks. Interestingly, this feature occurs at a similar threshold
value also for the historical time series which we discussed above.
2.3 Consumption Measures of Structural Transformation
Lastly, we turn to the stylized facts of structural transformation when final consumption expen-
diture shares are used as a measure of economic activity at the sectoral level. We previously
offered two main reasons why final consumption expenditure shares may exhibit different pat-
terns than production value added shares: the presence of investment and of imports and exports
and the fact that final consumption expenditure is a fundamentally distinct concept from value
added produced. The goal of this subsection is to establish that these differences between con-
sumption and production based measures do not matter much for agriculture and services, but
can have important implications for manufacturing.
Comparable cross–country panel data on consumption expenditure by sector are much less
available than such data on either employment or value added shares. We begin by presenting
relatively long time series evidence for the US and the UK in Figure 7. The main message
from the plots is that for these two countries, production and consumption measures display
very similar behavior, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Specifically, nominal consumption
16We report results for a cubic polynomial since adding higher order terms did not have a significant effect on
the fitted relationships.
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shares for agriculture and services are decreasing and increasing over time, respectively, just
as they were in the case for nominal value added shares, and the extent of the changes is quite
similar too. Moreover, the consumption share for manufacturing displays a hump shape, just
as it did in the case for the nominal value added share for manufacturing. Once again, the
quantitative features are also similar, with the peak of the curves occurring at similar values of
GDP per capita, and the extent of the decrease after the peak also being similar. One difference
between consumption shares and value added shares is that the consumption share for manufac-
turing tends to be a few percentage points higher than the value added share for manufacturing.
This occurs because of the fact that the consumption measure implicitly includes distribution
services such as retail trade in its measure of manufacturing consumption.
We next consider two data sets on final consumption expenditure by sector: the OECD
Consumption Expenditure Data Base and the Benchmark Studies of the International Compar-
isons Programme, as reported by the Penn World Table. The OECD data have reasonably long
time series for several currently rich countries, namely, Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, and
the United States as well as the seven EU countries Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy,
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The Benchmark Studies offer relatively large cross sec-
tions for the years 1980, 1985, and 1996. We define the sectors for consumption expenditure
following the usual conventions; for example, we use food as the category closest to agricul-
ture; for the details see Appendix A. For each data set, we pool the data and plot the nominal
consumption expenditure shares of the three sectors against GDP per capita measured in 1990
international dollars.
Figure 8 contains the plots for the OECD data and Figure 9 contains the plots for the Penn
World Table data. Two patterns are immediate: the final expenditure share for food tends to
decrease with the level of development while the final expenditure share for services tends to
increase with development. These two patterns are qualitatively similar to the patterns that we
have documented by using the production based measures of economic activity at the sectoral
level. However, when we examine the plot for manufacturing consumption we now see some
differences. Of particular interest is Korea; whereas it exhibits the same hump shape as the
other OECD countries for the nominal production value added share of manufacturing, we see
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Figure 7: Sectoral Shares of Nominal Consumption Expenditure – US and UK 1900–2008
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Figure 8: Sectoral Shares of Nominal Consumption Expenditure –
Various Countries, OECD 1970–2007
Non-EU countries and Aggregate of
7 EU Countries
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Figure 9: Sectoral Shares of Nominal Consumption Expenditure –
Cross Sections from the ICP Benchmark Studies 1980, 1985, 1996
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that its consumption share of manufacturing is virtually flat during a period of rapid growth.
The data from the PWT for the manufacturing consumption share effectively show a cloud.
While this plot is not necessarily inconsistent with a hump shape for each country coupled
with level differences across countries, it suggests that differences between production and
consumption measures may be a more common feature of the data in the larger sample of
countries. We think this is an important issue that merits further work. If the link between
consumption and production measures is different for current developing countries than it was
for countries that developed earlier, then this may well have implications for the nature of the
development path that these countries follow.17
3 Modeling Structural Transformation and Growth
In this section we present a natural extension of the one–sector growth model that incorporates
structural transformation. We develop our extension in two steps. In the first one, we consider
the well known two–sector version of the growth model that has separate consumption and
investment sectors. In the second step, we disaggregate consumption into the three components
agriculture, manufacturing, and services.
3.1 Background: A Two–Sector Version of the Growth Model
Our presentation of the two–sector growth model closely resembles that in Greenwood et al.
(1997), which is a version of Uzawa (1963). We assume an infinitely lived stand–in household
with preferences over consumption sequences {Ct} given by:
∞∑
t=0
βt log Ct (1)
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor. Note that, for simplicity, preferences are such that the
household does not value leisure. The household is endowed with one unit of productive time
and an initial stock of capital, K0.
17We are going to revisit this issue below when we discuss in detail our paper Herrendorf et al. (2013).
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There are two constant–returns–to–scale production functions which describe how con-
sumption (C) and investment (X) are produced from capital (k) and labor (n). It is convenient
to follow the literature and impose that the production functions are Cobb–Douglas and have
the same capital share:
Ct = kθct(Actnct)
1−θ
Xt = kθxt(Axtnxt)
1−θ
where Ait represents exogenous labor–augmenting technological progress in sector i. We adopt
the notational convention of using upper–case letters to refer to aggregate variables.
Capital accumulates as usual:
Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + Xt
where 0 < δ < 1 denotes the depreciation rate.
We assume that capital and labor are freely mobile between the two sectors so that feasibility
requires that in each period:
Kt = kct + kxt
1 = nct + nxt
As is standard, we study the competitive equilibrium for this economy. Although one can
obtain the competitive–equilibrium allocations by solving a social planner’s problem, we want
to emphasize the role of relative prices and therefore consider a sequence–of–markets compet-
itive equilibrium in which the price of the investment good is normalized to be equal to one in
each period. The price of the consumption good relative to the investment good is denoted by
Pt, the rental rate for capital is denoted by Rt, and the wage rate is denoted by Wt. We assume
that the household accumulates capital and rents it to firms.
We begin our characterization of the equilibrium by establishing that the capital–to–labor
ratios are equalized across sectors at each point in time. To see this note that the first–order
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conditions for the stand–in firm in sector i ∈ {c, x} are given by:
Rt = Ptθ
(
kct
nct
)θ−1
A1−θct = θ
(
kxt
nxt
)θ−1
A1−θxt
Wt = Pt(1 − θ)
(
kct
nct
)θ
A1−θit = (1 − θ)
(
kxt
nxt
)θ
A1−θxt
Combining these two equations and rearranging gives an expression for the capital–labor ratio
in sector i ∈ {c, x}:
kit
nit
=
θ
1 − θ
Wt
Rt
It follows that the capital–to–labor ratio in each sector is the same and equals the aggregate
capital–to–labor ratio:18
kct
nct
=
kxt
nxt
= Kt (2)
Next, we establish that the equilibrium value of the relative price Pt is pinned down by
technology. To see this, divide the first–order conditions for labor from the two sectors by each
other and use the fact that sectoral capital–to–labor ratios are equalized. This gives:
Pt =
(
Axt
Act
)1−θ
(3)
Equations (2) and (3) imply that
PtCt =
(
kct
nct
)θ
PtA1−θct nct = K
θ
t A
1−θ
xt nct
It follows that the model aggregates on the production side, that is, we can consider an aggregate
production function that produces a single good that can be turned into either consumption or
investment via a linear technology with marginal rate of transformation equal to Pt:
Yt = Xt + PtCt = Kθt (Axt)
1−θ(nxt + nct) = Kθt A
1−θ
xt (4)
18To see this note that
kct
nct
nct +
kxt
nxt
nxt = Kt(nct + nxt) = Kt.
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Additionally, equation (2) and the first–order conditions for the firm in the investment sector
imply that the marginal products of the aggregate production function determine the rental rate
of capital and the wage rate:
Rt = θKθ−1t A
1−θ
xt (5)
Wt = (1 − θ)Kθt A1−θxt (6)
To characterize the competitive equilibrium further, we turn to the household side. The
household’s maximization problem is:19
max
{Ct ,Kt+1}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βt log Ct s.t. PtCt + Kt+1 = (1 − δ + Rt)Kt + Wt
Letting µt denote the current–value Lagrange multiplier on the period t budget equation, the
first–order conditions for Ct and Kt are:
βt
Ct
= µtPt
1 − δ + Rt = µt−1
µt
Combining these two equations gives the Euler equation:
1
β
PtCt
Pt−1Ct−1
= 1 − δ + Rt (7)
Using equations (4) and (5), equation (7) can be written as a second–order difference equation
in the aggregate capital stock Kt. Given a value for the initial capital stock, this second–order
difference equation together with a transversality condition determine the equilibrium sequence
of capital stocks.
We are now ready to consider the possibility of a balanced growth path in this model. We
19Note that if total consumption grows at a constant rate γc, which will be the case below when we consider
generalized balanced growth, then the household’s objective function remains finite, and so is well defined. The
reason for this is that ∞∑
t=0
βt log Ct = [log C0 + log(1 + γc)]
∞∑
t=0
βtt < ∞
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start by assuming that both technologies improve at constant, though not necessarily equal,
rates γi > 0:
Ait+1
Ait
= 1 + γi, i = c, x
The standard definition of balanced growth is that endogenous variables grow at constant rates.
It turns out that this definition is too strict for models with structural transformation because the
very nature of structural transformation is that the sectoral composition changes. We therefore
follow the literature and use the weaker concept of generalized balanced growth path (GBGP),
which only requires that the real interest rate is constant.
The motivation for requiring that the real interest rate be constant is that although it may
exhibit short–term fluctuations, it does not show a long–term trend. This, of course. is one
of the Kaldor facts. The next result shows that along a GBGP of our two–sector model the
other four facts of Kaldor will also hold, that is, Kt and Yt grow at constant rates and Kt/Yt and
RtKt/Yt are constant.
Proposition 1. If a GBGP exists, then the Kaldor facts hold along the GBGP.
Proof. Since Rt is constant along a GBGP, it suffices to show that Kt, Yt and Xt all grow at rate
γx.
The fact that R is constant and equation (5) holds in period t and t + 1 implies:
Axt+1
Axt
=
Kt+1
Kt
(8)
It follows that Kt also grows at the constant rate of γx. Using Yt = A1−θxt K
θ
t we have:
Yt+1
Yt
=
(
Axt+1
Axt
)1−θ (Kt+1
Kt
)θ
(9)
Using equation (8) this gives:
Yt+1
Yt
= (1 + γx)θ(1 + γx)1−θ = 1 + γx (10)
Constant growth of K necessarily implies constant growth of X. The fact that the aggregate
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technology is Cobb–Douglas implies that factor shares are constant even off a GBGP. 
If Kt grows at the constant rate γx, then the law of motion for capital implies that Xt must
grow at the same constant rate. Equation (4) then implies that PtCt must also grow at this same
rate. Substituting this growth rate into equation (7) pins down the constant value of the rental
rate of capital along a GBGP:
1
β
(1 + γx) = 1 − δ + R
Given a value for Ax0, using this version of the Euler equation and the condition on the equilib-
rium rental rate (5), we obtain the unique value of K0 along a GBGP:
K0 =
[
βθ
(1 + γx) − β(1 − δ)
] 1
1−θ
Ax0 (11)
We note several features of this generalized balanced growth path. First, Kt and Ct grow
at different rates along the GBGP. In particular, since (3) implies that Pt grows at gross rate
[(1 + γx)/(1 + γc)]1−θ, and PtCt grows at gross rate (1 + γx), it follows that Ct grows at gross
rate (1 + γx)θ (1 + γc)1−θ, i.e., a weighted average of the two sectoral growth rates in technology.
Given that Xt grows at the same rate as both Axt and Kt, it follows that sectoral employment
and capital shares are constant along the balanced growth path. In other words, although in this
model differential rates of technological progress lead to changes in relative prices of sectoral
outputs, these price changes are not associated with any changes in factor allocations over time.
For future reference, it is of interest to note that although we assumed that technological
progress in both sectors is constant over time, this is not required for the existence of a GBGP.
In fact, because along the GBGP the difference in technological progress only shows up in
prices and not in allocations, it follows that the same results would apply even if the growth
rate of technological progress in the consumption sector varied over time. This would have no
effect on how capital and labor are allocated and would only show up in the behavior of the
relative price Pt. While in this case not all variables would grow at constant rates, it would still
be true that the rental rate on capital would be constant and that Yt and Kt would grow at the
same constant rate. Thus, there would still be a GBGP.
29
3.2 A Benchmark Model of Growth and Structural Transformation
We use the model of the previous section as the starting point for our analysis of structural
transformation in the context of the growth model.
3.2.1 Set up of the Benchmark Model
As in the previous section, we assume an infinitely lived stand–in household that has prefer-
ences characterized by (1) and is endowed with one unit of time and an initial capital stock.
Different than in the previous section, we now assume that Ct is a composite of agricultural
consumption (cat), manufacturing consumption (cmt) and service consumption (cst):
Ct =
[
ω
1
ε
a (cat − c¯a) ε−1ε + ω
1
ε
m (cmt)
ε−1
ε + ω
1
ε
s (cst + c¯s)
ε−1
ε
] ε
ε−1
(12)
where c¯i, ωi ≥ 0 and ε > 0. The functional form (12) is a parsimonious choice that allows us
to capture two features on the demand side that are potentially important for understanding the
reallocation of activity across these three sectors: how the demand of the household reacts to
changes in income and in relative prices. In particular, the presence of the two terms c¯a and
c¯s allows for the period utility function to be non–homothetic and therefore the possibility that
changes in income will lead to changes in expenditure shares even if relative prices are constant.
The parameter ε influences the elasticity of substitution between the three goods, and hence the
response of nominal expenditure shares to changes in relative prices. Note, however, that in the
above specification the elasticity of substitution is not equal to ε because it also depends on the
non–homotheticity terms.
We generalize the previous model to allow for four Cobb–Douglas production functions,
one for each of the three consumption goods and one for the investment good. Formally, the
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production functions are given by:20
cit = kθit(Aitnit)
1−θ, i ∈ {a,m, s} (13)
Xt = kθxt(Axtnxt)
1−θ (14)
There is a tradition in the literature of working with only three production functions, with the
assumption that all investment is produced by the manufacturing sector. Under this assumption,
the output of the manufacturing sector can be used as either consumption or investment whereas
the output of the other two sectors can only be used as consumption. We have not adopted this
specification for two reasons. First, despite the apparent reasonableness of the claim that in-
vestment is to first approximation produced exclusively by the manufacturing sector, it turns out
that this is not supported by the data. Moreover, such an assumption is becoming increasingly
at odds with the data over time, due at least in part to the fact that software is both a sizeable
and increasing component of investment, and most software innovation takes place in the ser-
vice sector. In fact, total investment has exceeded the size of the entire manufacturing sector
in the US since 2000. The second reason for considering a separate investment sector derives
from evidence that technological progress in the investment sector has been more rapid than in
the rest of the economy; see, for example Greenwood et al (1997). Because the possibility of
differential rates of technological progress across sectors will play a key role in the subsequent
analysis, we want to allow for the possibility that this rate is different in the investment sector.
Capital is accumulated as usual:
Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + Xt
As before we assume that capital and labor are freely mobile.21 With four sectors, the feasibility
20We follow much of the literature in abstracting from the differences between physical capital and land and
treating land as part of physical capital. We then restrict attention to Cobb–Douglas production functions in capital
and labor that have the same capital share in all sectors, which is analytically very convenient, because it implies
that we can aggregate the sectoral production functions to an economy–wide Cobb–Douglas production function.
In Section 5.1.2 below we will explore to which extent the assumption of equal sectoral capital shares is borne out
by the data. For now, we just mention that even if one thinks that sectoral capital shares (where capital includes
land) are similar, then there are still important applications for which it is crucial that land is a fixed factor. For
such applications one needs to model land and physical capital separately.
21We discuss the case of restricted labor mobility in Section 7.2.
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conditions now take the form:
Kt = kat + kmt + kst + kxt
1 = nat + nmt + nst + nxt
3.2.2 Equilibrium Properties of the Benchmark Model
We again consider a sequence–of–markets competitive equilibrium in which the price of the
investment good is normalized to equal one in each period. The prices of the consumption
goods relative to the investment good are denoted by pit, i ∈ {a,m, s}. We again assume that the
household accumulates capital and rents it to firms.
Several key properties of the two–sector model that we established above continue to hold
in the four–sector model. Specifically, using the same logic as in the previous section, one can
show that the capital–to–labor ratios are equalized across the four sectors at each point in time,
and are equal to the aggregate capital–to–labor ratio:
kit
nit
= Kt, i = a,m, s, x (15)
Moreover, as before, relative prices are determined by technology:
pit =
(
Axt
Ait
)1−θ
, i = a,m, s (16)
Using the above results, one can also show that our multi–sector model aggregates on the pro-
duction side:
Yt = patcat + pmtcmt + pstcst + Xt = Kθt A
1−θ
xt (17)
Lastly, the first–order conditions from the firm problems, (5) and (6), are still valid.
On the household side the model is more involved now. In particular, the household problem
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now takes the form:
max
{cat ,cmt ,cst ,Kt+1}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βt log
[
ω
1
ε
a (cat − c¯a) ε−1ε + ω
1
ε
m (cmt)
ε−1
ε + ω
1
ε
s (cst + c¯s)
ε−1
ε
] ε
ε−1
s.t. patcat + pmtcmt + pstcst + Kt+1 = (1 − δ + Rt)Kt + Wt
In what follows, we show that this problem can be split into two subproblems: (i) how to allo-
cate total income between total consumption and savings; (ii) how to allocate total consumption
expenditure between the three consumption goods. We develop a useful representation in which
the first subproblem closely resembles the problem of the household in the two–sector model
considered previously.
In order to have a well defined household problem, we need to make sure that the consump-
tion of agricultural goods will exceed the subsistence term c¯a in each period. Even if this is
the case, a corner solution may still arise in which the household chooses zero consumption of
services. For now, we assume that the household problem is well defined and that its solution
is interior in all periods. In Proposition 2 below, we offer a formal condition to ensure that this
is the case along the GBGP. Essentially this will boil down to requiring that in each period total
consumption is “large enough” relative to the two terms c¯a and c¯s.
The first–order conditions for an interior solution for the three consumption categories are:
1
Ct
ω
1
ε
a (cat − c¯a)− 1εC
1
ε
t = λt pat (18)
1
Ct
ω
1
ε
m(cmt)−
1
εC
1
ε
t = λt pmt (19)
1
Ct
ω
1
ε
s (cst + c¯s)−
1
εC
1
ε
t = λt pst (20)
where λt denotes the current–value Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint in period t. If
one raises each of the equations (18)–(20) to the power 1−ε, adds them, and uses the definition
(12) of Ct, then one obtains:
1
Ct
= λt
[
ωa(pat)1−ε + ωm(pmt)1−ε + ωs(pst)1−ε
] 1
1−ε (21)
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Given that λt is the marginal value of an additional unit of expenditure in period t, it follows that
the other term on the right–hand side is naturally interpreted as the price of a unit of composite
consumption. In view of this we will define the price index Pt by:
Pt ≡
[
ωa (pat)1−ε + ωm (pmt)1−ε + ωs (pst)1−ε
] 1
1−ε (22)
If one adds the three first–order conditions (18)–(20) and uses this definition of Pt, one also
obtains:
patcat + pmtcmt + pstcst = PtCt + patc¯a − pstc¯s (23)
It follows that the household’s maximization problem can be broken down into two subprob-
lems:
(i) Intertemporal Problem. Allocate total income among the composite consumption good
and savings:
max
{Ct ,Kt+1}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βt log Ct s.t. PtCt + Kt+1 = (1 − δ + rt)Kt + wt − patc¯a + pstc¯s
(ii) Static Problem. Allocate the period t consumption expenditure PtCt among the three
consumption goods:
max
cat ,cmt ,cst
[
ω
1
ε
a (cat − c¯a) ε−1ε + ω
1
ε
m (cmt)
ε−1
ε + ω
1
ε
s (cst + c¯s)
ε−1
ε
] ε
ε−1
s.t. patcat + pmtcmt + pstcst = PtCt + patc¯a − pstc¯s
This representation nicely separates out the growth component of the model from the struc-
tural transformation component of the model. From the perspective of balanced growth in the
aggregates Kt and Ct, the representation looks like the two–sector growth model with the excep-
tion of one detail: this economy behaves as if there is a time varying endowment, reflected by
the term −patc¯a + pstc¯s. If this endowment happens to be zero at all dates, then the equivalence
to a standard two–sector model is exact. Be that as it may, the Euler equation is still of the form
(7). Moreover, although the expression for the relative price Pt is somewhat more complicated
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in the current setting compared to the two–sector model, the equilibrium value of this relative
price can still be determined directly from primitives without solving for the full equilibrium.
From the perspective of structural transformation, the above representation implies that we
can focus on the solution to the static problem of allocating each period’s consumption expen-
diture between the three consumption goods. The first–order conditions (18)–(20) characterize
the solution to this static problem. For future reference, we note two useful implications of
the first–order conditions. First, they impose conditions on the ratios of any two consumption
goods:
(
pat
pmt
)ε cat − c¯a
cmt
=
ωa
ωm
(24)(
pst
pmt
)ε cst + c¯s
cmt
=
ωs
ωm
(25)
Second, they impose a condition on the ratio of the expenditure on composite consumption and
the expenditure on manufactured consumption:
PtCt
pmtcmt
=
ωa
ωm
(
Amt
Aat
)(1−θ)(1−ε)
+ 1 +
ωs
ωm
(
Amt
Ast
)(1−θ)(1−ε) (26)
Equations (24)–(26) will play a key role below when we study the details of structural transfor-
mation within the framework of our four–sector model.
3.3 Connecting the Benchmark Model to Measures of Structural Trans-
formation
Since we will eventually ask whether versions of this model can help us understand the stylized
facts of structural transformation that we documented in Section 2, it is relevant to briefly dis-
cuss some issues related to how one connects the model just described to the various measures
from the data that we have previously examined. While this might appear obvious, there are a
couple of issues that require notice.
In Section 2, we disaggregated total value added into the value added of agriculture, manu-
facturing, and services and measured the shares of these three sectors in total value added. To
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connect our model with these measures of sectoral activity, it is natural to assume that the sec-
toral production functions that we have specified in the benchmark model represent value added
production functions. However, because we have modeled the investment sector as a separate
sector, one also needs to allocate the value added from the investment sector among the other
three sectors. The literature often assumes that the entire value added of the investment sector
belongs to manufacturing. This assumption is inconsistent with the data, for the simple reason
that in recent years in the United States the value added of the investment sector has exceeded
the value added of the (total) manufacturing sector. An alternative is to allocate investment
value added to the other sectors using constant shares. This is also at odds with the data, since
as shown in Herrendorf et al. (2013), the increasing importance of software as a component of
investment has led to an increase in the share of investment value added occurring in the service
sector. Nonetheless, since it serves to facilitate transparency, we will adopt this alternative as
a benchmark in the next section when we discuss the qualitative features of balanced growth
paths in different special cases of the model. However, it should be kept in mind that movements
in the sectoral distribution of investment value added shares could affect the predictions that we
highlight. As a practical matter, while this effect can matter, it is probably not so relevant at the
quantitative level because total investment is a relatively small share of GDP.
The second issue concerns how to connect the model with production value added data ver-
sus consumption expenditure data. Specifically, assuming that the sector production functions
are interpreted as value added production functions leads to a difficulty when trying to connect
the model with data on consumption expenditure shares. Because equilibrium requires that
cit = kθit(Aitnit)
1−θ, it would seem natural to identify pitcit/
∑
j p jtc jt as the model’s measure of
the nominal consumption share of sector i in period t. However, this share is not the appro-
priate measure for the nominal consumption expenditure share of sector i as measured in the
data. To see why, let us return to the example discussed earlier of the purchase of a cotton shirt.
To measure the contribution of this shirt to manufactured final consumption expenditure, we
need to aggregate all value added that goes into the production of the shirt through the use of
intermediate inputs from each of the three sectors. This requires us to take into account the
input–output relationships about how value added is aggregated into final consumption expen-
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diture. In contrast, the above definition of consumption shares includes only the value added
that came from the manufacturing sector itself, and so it does not reflect how final consumption
expenditure is measured in a world in which each sector uses intermediate inputs from the other
sectors.
To avoid this problem, one could alternatively assume that pitcit/
∑
p jtc jt in the model does
correspond to the nominal consumption expenditure share of sector i in period t as measured
in the data. But since in equilibrium cit = kθit(Aitnit)
1−θ, it would then follow that pitkθit(Aitnit)
1−θ
is not an appropriate measure of value added from sector i in period t as measured in the data.
Returning to the shirt example, this piece of cmt now reflects the value added components from
each of the three sectors that went into producing the final product, and so it cannot be the
value added from one particular sector. In order to maintain consistency, it must be that the
production functions summarize the labor and capital from the various stages of production
that are used to produce final consumption expenditure. In order to obtain value added shares
one would have to use (inverse) input–output relationships to unbundle the final consumption
expenditure into its value added components. Moreover, since nit now reflects all of the labor
that went into producing the shirt at each of the various stages of production, it is no longer the
case either that nit is an appropriate measure of the employment share of sector i in period t.
The bottom line from this discussion is that if one wants to have a model that can simulta-
neously address the shares of sectoral employment, value added, and consumption expenditure,
then one will need to explicitly include the details of the input–output structure involved in
transforming sectoral value added into sectoral consumption expenditure. We have chosen not
to do this in order to preserve a greater degree of transparency in the presentation. In view
of this, we need to keep in mind that when we discuss the model implications for the mea-
sures of structural transformation, we can either connect the production measures (employment
shares and value added shares) to the data, implying that the consumption measure (consump-
tion expenditure shares) does not have a close empirical counterpart, or we can connect the
consumption measure to the data implying that the two production measures do not have close
empirical counterparts. Whichever way we choose, our model will not be able to make state-
ments about all three measures of structural transformation at the same time. Moreover, as we
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discuss later on in more detail, one should not assume that preference and technology parame-
ters are invariant to the interpretation that one imposes on the model objects.
4 The Economic Forces Behind Structural Transformation:
Theoretical Analysis
The Kaldor facts regarding balanced growth over long periods of time have led the profession
to focus on specifications of the one–sector neoclassical growth model that generate balanced
growth. The evidence that we presented in Section 2 suggests that the continuing process of re-
allocation of activity across sectors coexists with the stable behavior of aggregate variables that
characterizes balanced growth. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that the theoretical litera-
ture on structural transformation has looked for specifications of the previous model that give
rise to a generalized balanced growth path along which structural transformation occurs. We
begin this section by summarizing the results of this theoretical literature and its predictions for
the nature of structural transformation. We close this section with a discussion of whether the
focus on specifications that deliver exact balanced growth might be too stringent. Irrespective
of whether this is the case, we believe that the search for specifications that deliver balanced
growth and structural transformation has proven useful in helping researchers isolate various
forces that are potentially important in shaping structural transformation.
4.1 Two Special Cases with Analytical Solutions
Our previous derivations put us in position to easily summarize recent findings in the literature
about the joint possibility of generalized balanced growth and structural transformation. In
this subsection we focus on two recent papers that emphasize different economic forces behind
structural transformation, notably Kongsamut et al. (2001) and Ngai and Pissarides (2007).
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4.1.1 Preliminaries
If we are to look for a balanced growth path it is natural to limit ourselves to situations in which
technological progress is constant. We therefore assume:
Ait+1
Ait
= 1 + γi, i = a,m, c, x (27)
As previously noted, even if all aggregates grow at constant rates, it will typically not be the
case that all sector–level variables grow at constant rates. We therefore follow the literature and
focus on generalized balanced growth paths (GBGP), which are defined to be equilibrium paths
along which the rental rate of capital is constant, i.e., Rt = R.
We next turn to the issue of whether there are specifications of the model for which a GBGP
exists along which structural transformation occurs. At this stage we will simply pose this ques-
tion from a qualitative perspective. Specifically, we will say that a GBGP exhibits structural
transformation if either sectoral employment shares (nit) or sectoral value added (or consump-
tion expenditure) shares (pitcit/Yt) are not constant for all three consumption sectors. The issue
of generating the “right” patterns of structural transformation, both qualitatively and quantita-
tively, will be taken up later.
As a starting point it is useful to examine two special cases. The first special case makes
the extreme assumption that the three consumption goods are perfect substitutes: c¯a = c¯s = 0,
ωa = ωm = ωs, Aat = Amt = Ast, and ε→ ∞. In this case the model is identical at the aggregate
level to the two–sector model in the previous section, and so it has a unique balanced growth
path in terms of Ct and Kt. However, since the three consumption goods are perfect substitutes
and have identical production functions, the allocation of labor and capital between the three
sectors is indeterminate, beyond the restriction that capital–to–labor ratios must be the same in
all sectors with positive output. Because of this indeterminacy it is obviously the case that one
can accommodate whatever patterns one desires in terms of changes in either labor allocations
or value added shares across sectors. However, since, as we have seen in Section 2 above, the
features of structural transformation appear to be stable over time and across countries, this
does not seem a very appealing way to account for structural transformation.
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The second special case of interest assumes that c¯a = c¯s = 0 and ε = 1, so that the prefer-
ence aggregator is Cobb Douglas. We do not present the details here, but one can show that the
unique balanced growth path has constant sectoral labor and value added shares. This happens
despite the fact that we have not restricted the relative rates of productivity growth among the
three consumption sectors. Intuitively, with Cobb–Douglas preferences, employment and value
added shares are independent of relative productivities. With sectoral employment and capital
shares fixed, differences in relative productivities generate differences in relative outputs, but
these differences in output are perfectly offset in terms of value added shares by changes in rel-
ative prices. While this special case gives rise to balanced growth and avoids the indeterminacy
of the previous case, it does not give rise to structural transformation along the balanced growth
path.
In what follows we describe two scenarios that can generate structural transformation along
a GBGP. Each of them can be understood as a departure from this second special case.
4.1.2 Case 1: Income Effects and Structural Transformation
Case 1 corresponds to the analysis found in Kongsamut et al. (2001) and represents the extreme
scenario in which all structural change is driven by income effects that are generated by the
non–homotheticity terms c¯a and c¯s when income changes but relative prices remain the same.
For this case we assume that technological progress is uniform across all consumption sectors
(γi = γ j for all i, j = a,m, s) and that the parameter governing the elasticity of substitution
among consumption goods is unity (ε = 1).22 The consumption aggregator (12) then takes the
well known Stone–Geary form:
Ct = ωa log (cat − c¯a) + ωm log (cmt) + ωs log (cst + c¯s) (28)
With c¯a and c¯s positive it is easy to see intuitively how one may get structural transformation
along a GBGP; as income grows, the non–homotheticity of the demands for the different con-
sumption goods will lead to changes in the value added shares. However, there is a potential
issue in obtaining generalized balanced growth when c¯a and c¯s are positive. To see this, recall
22Note that ε equals the elasticity of substitution only if c¯a = c¯s = 0.
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the Euler equation (7) for the household problem. From this equation, if Rt is constant over
time, then it must be that PtCt grows at a constant rate. From the period–budget equation, (23),
and noting that factor payments are equal to output, we have:
PtCt + patc¯a − pstc¯s = Kθt A1−θxt + (1 − δ)Kt − Kt+1 (29)
Since the right–hand side grows at rate γx, PtCt + patc¯a − pstc¯s must also grow at rate γx. If
pa0c¯a − ps0c¯s is not zero, then patc¯a − pstc¯s will grow at rate γx only if relative prices also
grow at rate γx. However, this contradicts the fact that pat and pst both grow at gross rate
[(1 + γxt)/(1 + γct)]1−θ, which is implied by expression (16). Hence, balanced growth requires
that pa0c¯a − ps0c¯s = 0, which is equivalent to:
c¯a
c¯s
=
(
Aa0
As0
)1−θ
(30)
Note that since both relative prices grow at the same rate, this condition implies that patc¯a −
pstc¯s = 0 at all dates t.23
Given condition (30), equation (29) simply requires that PtCt grows at rate γx. From the
perspective of balanced growth this economy then looks very much like the two–sector model
that we considered in the previous section. In particular, similar to that two–sector model, the
share of labor and capital devoted to consumption versus investment is constant along a GBGP.
We make two remarks regarding condition (30). First, note that if either of c¯a or c¯s is
positive, then they must both be positive. As we discuss in a later section, many papers have
implicitly assumed that c¯a > 0 and c¯s = 0, which is inconsistent with condition (30). Sec-
ond, this condition relates the parameters of preferences and technology to each other, and is
therefore somewhat of a “fragile” condition. We shall return to this point later in this section.
Next we consider whether structural transformation occurs along the GBGP. To examine
23This point illustrates that the assumption of the same rate of technological progress in the agriculture and
service sectors is a necessary condition and not merely a simplification.
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this note that if ε = 1, then (24)–(25) imply the Stone–Geary demand system:
cat = ωa
PtCt
pat
+ c¯a (31)
cmt = ωm
PtCt
pmt
(32)
cst = ωs
PtCt
pst
− c¯s (33)
Moreover, the assumption that all consumption sectors grow at the same rate implies that the
relative prices of the three consumption goods are constant:
pit
Pt
=
pi0
P0
, i ∈ {a,m, s}
Hence cat, cmt, and cst grow at a slower rate, at the same rate, and at a faster rate than Ct,
respectively. Given that the relative prices of the three consumption goods are constant, it
follows that pitcit/PtCt is decreasing for agriculture, constant for manufacturing and increasing
for services. Since total consumption expenditures are a constant share of total output, it follows
that these properties also carry over to both nit and pitcit/Yt.
In summary, and more formally, we have the following result:
Proposition 2. Assume that condition (30) holds and that
c¯s ≤ ωs
(
As0
Ax0
)1−θ [
Kθ0A
1−θ
x0 − (γx + δ)K0
]
(34)
where K0 is given by (11).
Then there is a unique GBGP. Along the GBGP, the employment and nominal value added
shares of the investment sector are constant. The employment and nominal value added shares
are decreasing for agriculture, constant for manufacturing and increasing for services.
Proof. We start by noting that it is straightforward to show that (11) implies that Kθ0A
1−θ
x0 >
(γx + δ)K0. Hence, P0C0 = Kθ0A
1−θ
x0 − (γx + δ)K0 > 0 and condition (34) is well defined.
Condition (34) ensures that the right–hand side of (33) is positive at t = 0. Since the economy
grows while relative prices remain constant, this implies that the right–hand side is positive for
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all t. In this case, equations (31)–(33) are well defined and they have a unique interior solution
for cat, cmt, cst. The existence of a unique GBGP and the statements about the shares then follow
directly from the previous discussion. 
4.1.3 Case 2: Relative Price Effects and Structural Transformation
The second case that we consider corresponds to the analysis found in Ngai and Pissarides
(2007).24 Whereas the previous case generated structural transformation purely via income
changes and asked whether this could be consistent with balanced growth, Ngai and Pissarides
consider the polar extreme case in which structural transformation is generated purely from
changes in relative prices and ask whether this can be consistent with balanced growth. Ac-
cordingly, they assume that c¯a = c¯s = 0. In order to have relative price changes operating it
is clearly necessary to have differential rates of technological progress among the three con-
sumption goods sectors, so no restrictions will be placed on the relative values of γi. Given our
earlier discussion, however, we know that ε will have to take on a value other than unity.
The analysis of this case follows directly from our analysis of the two–sector model. Specif-
ically, if the values of γa, γm, and γs are different, then the price index Pt will not grow at a
constant rate. However, as noted at the end of the section on the two–sector model, this has no
bearing on the existence of a unique GBGP; there still is a unique GBGP that features a constant
share of labor and capital allocated to total consumption. Along the GBGP the value of PtCt
will grow at the constant rate γx even though neither component grows at a constant rate.
To assess the implications for structural transformation we again turn to equations (24) and
(25). Using equation (16) for relative prices, these two equations can now be written as:
cat
cmt
=
ωa
ωm
(
Aat
Amt
)ε(1−θ)
(35)
cst
cmt
=
ωs
ωm
(
Ast
Amt
)ε(1−θ)
(36)
24This work builds on the important earlier contribution of Baumol (1967).
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Noting that cit = Kθt A
1−θ
it nit, we also have:
nat
nmt
=
ωa
ωm
(
Amt
Aat
)(1−ε)(1−θ)
(37)
nst
nmt
=
ωs
ωm
(
Amt
Ast
)(1−ε)(1−θ)
(38)
Recalling that labor allocated to the overall consumption sector is constant, it follows that if
ε = 1 we have the earlier result that the nit are constant in each of the three consumption sectors.
So too are the values of pitcit/PtCt and pitcit/Yt. If ε differs from one, then the model can
generate structural transformation along a GBGP as long as the rates of technological progress
differ among the three consumption sectors. In contrast to Case 1, it is not true in this case that
cmt is a constant proportion of Ct, nor is true that Ct grows at a constant rate. Without imposing
some additional structure one cannot say more about the nature of structural transformation that
occurs.
To simplify exposition, we focus on the special case in which technological progress is
strongest in agriculture and weakest in services, that is, γa > γm > γs. If in addition we assume
that ε < 1, then the above expressions imply that along a GBGP the values of nit, pitcit/PtCt
and pitcit/Yt are decreasing for agriculture and increasing for services. The behavior of these
values for manufacturing is ambiguous in terms of the direction of change, but the size of the
change is bounded by the sizes of the change in the other two sectors. Proposition 5 of Ngai
and Pissarides (2007) shows that the evolution of nm in this case will be either monotonically
decreasing or hump shaped.
More formally, we summarize the above discussion with the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Let c¯a = c¯s = 0, ε < 1, γa > γm > γs > 0, and γx > 0.
There is a unique GBGP. Along the GBGP, the shares of employment and nominal value
added (in current prices) of the investment sector are constant; the shares of employment and
nominal value added (in current prices) of the consumption sectors behave as follows: the
agricultural shares decline; the services shares rise; the manufacturing shares decrease less
than the agricultural shares and increase less than the service shares.
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4.1.4 Qualitative Assessment
The previous subsections outlined two different theories of structural transformation in the con-
text of generalized balanced growth. Although we postpone a more rigorous assessment of the
economic mechanisms implicit in these two theories until a later section, it is still of interest at
this point to assess the extent to which each of the theories taken individually can account for
some of the broad patterns that we documented in Section 2. We will see that while each theory
can qualitatively account for some of the patterns found earlier, each also has some limitations.
Given the qualifications that we have noted previously in connecting the model with data,
we keep in mind that we can either connect the production measures (employment shares and
value added shares) to the data, implying that the consumption measure (consumption expen-
diture shares) does not have a close empirical counterpart, or we can connect the consumption
measure to the data, implying that the two production measures do not have close empirical
counterparts. Whichever way we choose to proceed, our benchmark model will not be able to
make statements about all three measures of structural transformation at the same time.
We begin with the model of Kongsamut et al. (2001). Since the investment sector uses
a constant share of labor and accounts for a constant share of (nominal) output, it will not
influence the trend behavior of any quantities if it is allocated across the three sectors in constant
proportions. Assuming this and starting with the nominal production measures, we conclude
that the model can account for the increase in the service sector shares and the decrease in
the agricultural sector measures along its GBGP, but it does not generate a hump shape for
the manufacturing sector measures. If one allows for the investment share of manufacturing to
decrease over time, as is true in the US data, then the model could generate a decline in both
production measures for manufacturing. The increasing share of services in investment would
only accentuate the rising employment and nominal value added shares for services. Turning to
the nominal consumption expenditure measures, the model can account for the increase in the
service share, the near constancy of the manufacturing share, and the decrease in the agricultural
share.
The model of Kongsamut et al. (2001) has two additional implications that are counterfac-
tual. First, along its generalized balanced growth relative prices need to be constant. It follows
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that along a GBGP the real measures of structural transformation must display exactly the same
properties as the nominal measures, which means that the model cannot account for the quanti-
tative differences between the nominal and the real measures. Second, the model of Kongsamut
et al. (2001) implies that in sufficiently poor economies, the household will consume a zero
quantity of services and employment in services will also be zero. In contrast, we saw in Sec-
tion 2 that even in the poorest countries service employment and value added are bounded away
from zero.
Next we turn to the model of Ngai and Pissarides (2007). Once again we note that since
along the GBGP the share of labor devoted to investment is constant and the nominal share of
investment in output is constant, any constant allocation of investment across the three sectors
will not influence of the trend properties. In this case, given the previously assumed ranking for
the rates of technological progress, we conclude that structural transformation along the model’s
GBGP is qualitatively consistent with the evidence for employment and nominal value added
shares in both agriculture and services. While the model does not necessarily deliver a hump
shape for the manufacturing shares of employment and nominal valued added, it can deliver
this for certain parameter values. Turning to the nominal consumption expenditure measures,
the model can account for the increase in the service share and the decrease in the agricultural
share, and can qualitatively produce hump–shaped dynamics for manufacturing, though this is
not guaranteed.
However, the model of Ngai and Pissarides (2007) cannot account for the behavior of all
real shares, irrespective of whether we use production or consumption related measures. In par-
ticular, given the assumptions about relative TFPs and the CES utility function being inelastic
– i.e., ε ∈ [0, 1), the model cannot generate the decreases in the real quantities of agriculture
and manufacturing relative to services that we documented in Section 2 above. The reason for
this is that with a CES utility function, nominal and real shares necessarily move in oppos-
ing directions. Given that the model accounts for the relative decline of the nominal shares
of agriculture and manufacturing, this implies that it cannot account for the relative decline of
the real shares. To see why nominal and real shares move in opposite directions, consider the
implications of a decrease in the price of manufacturing relative to services. If ε ∈ [0, 1), then
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the nominal quantity of manufacturing decreases relative to that of services whereas the real
quantity of manufactured goods relative to services remains the same if ε = 0 and increases if
ε ∈ (0, 1).
In summary, although each of these two specifications can account for some of the qualita-
tive patterns that we documented previously, neither of them is able to match all of the patterns.
However, the previous discussion suggests that a model featuring both income and relative price
effects might successfully match all of the patterns. For example, adding non–homotheticities
to the Ngai–Pissarides model could in principle allow the model to generate an decrease in the
quantity of manufacturing relative to services. While such a specification would not permit a
balanced growth path, this is a more general issue to which we will return to later in this section.
4.2 Alternative Specifications
In the preceding analysis, we have summarized the results from two papers regarding the pos-
sibility of simultaneously having structural transformation and generalized balanced growth.
We chose these two papers because they illustrate two different channels through which ex-
penditure shares may change over time: income changes and relative–price changes. In this
subsection we describe some alternative formulations of these two channels that have appeared
in the literature.
4.2.1 Other Specifications Emphasizing the Effects of Income Changes
Above we chose a specification of preferences where the effects of income changes on expen-
diture shares were captured by the non–homotheticity terms c¯a and c¯s. While we think that
this is a tractable and transparent way of introducing income effects, there are several alter-
native specifications of non–homothetic preferences in the literature. Here we discuss some
examples.
In the first quantitative analysis of structural transformation within the framework of the
growth model, Echevarria (1997) generated effects from changes in income by using the fol-
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lowing alternative specification of the intertemporal utility function:
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
αa log ca + αm log cm + αs log cs − η
(
1
cρaa
+
1
cρmm
+
1
cρss
)]
where αi > 0, η, ρi ≥ 0. If η = 0 then the preferences reduce to a Cobb–Douglas specification,
but if η > 0 and at least one of the ρi > 0 then the preferences are not homothetic. To see some
of the features of this specification it is useful to examine the properties of the marginal utility
of good i, which is given by:
MUi(ci) = αic−1i + ηρic
−1−ρi
i (39)
Note first that the marginal utility of each good will be infinite for zero consumption quantities,
implying that the household chooses interior consumption quantities. The second term is posi-
tive if ηρi > 0. In this case, it goes to infinity as ci becomes arbitrarily small and it goes to zero
as ci becomes arbitrarily large.
If, as in Echevarria’s calibration, η > 0 and ρa > ρm > ρs = 0, then at low levels of income
(and hence of consumption), there is a force in favor of higher ca and cm and of lower cs, and the
force is stronger for ca than for cm. In contrast, at high levels of income this force disappears.
Intuitively, one can use the parameters η and ρi to achieve the same qualitative effects that are
generated by the parameters c¯a and c¯s in our benchmark model.
The main advantage of Echevarria’s specification of period utility is that an interior solution
to the static period problem exists for any positive level of income. This is in contrast to what
happens in our benchmark model, since if c¯a > 0 and the present value of income is lower than
the present value of {patc¯a}, then the household cannot afford to purchase at least c¯a units of the
agricultural good in all periods and our period utility will not be defined in at least one period.
From an analytical perspective, the disadvantage of Echevarria’s specification is that it is not
consistent with generalized balanced growth. The reason for this is the presence of the term
ηc−ρ jj in the period utility function. If η = 0, then period utility is of the homothetic log form
and a GBGP exists. In contrast, if η > 0, then it is impossible for the value of total consumption,∑
j∈{a,m,s} p jtc jt, to grow at the same constant rate at which technological progress grows. As we
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saw in Section 3.2 above, this would be required for a GBGP with constant real interest rate to
exist.
A recent paper by Boppart (2011) explores more general preferences that are consistent
with balanced growth. In particular, Boppart specifies indirect period utility functions that fall
into the class of “price–independent–generalized–linearity” preferences defined by Muellbauer
(1975, 1976). These preferences are more general than Gorman preferences in that they gen-
erate nonlinear Engel curves. Nonetheless they aggregate and allow for a stand–in household.
There are two advantages of using “price–independent–generalized–linearity” preferences in
the context of structural transformation. First, they avoid the awkward feature of our benchmark
specification that can lead to utility not being defined for sufficiently small income. Second, as
Boppart establishes, they are consistent with balanced growth if the technology side is as we
specified it above.
A different approach to generating effects from changes in income is Foellmi and Zweimu¨ller
(2008). Whereas our benchmark model implicitly aggregated individual consumption goods
into three broad sectors and defined preferences over the amounts of the three resulting ag-
gregates, these authors specify preferences over an unbounded mass of potential consumption
goods. Preferences are such that for each good, marginal utility is finite at zero consumption and
decreases to zero at some finite satiation level of consumption. Over time, as income increases,
the mass of goods that are consumed increases, so that there is adjustment along both the in-
tensive and the extensive margin. The order in which the goods will be introduced is uniquely
determined by the model’s primitives: all of the goods are symmetric from the perspective of
production but are given different weights in preferences.25
The fact that new goods are consumed over time implies that labor will necessarily be
reallocated across activities over time. In terms of basic economic forces, the key mechanism at
work comes from the fact that different goods have different income elasticities. Different than
in the specification of our benchmark model, however, any particular good in this model will
have an income elasticity of zero asymptotically since at some date satiation will be reached.
In order to connect their model to the standard facts of structural transformation, Foellmi
25This type of preferences is sometimes called “hierarchical preferences”. It was first used by Murphy et al.
(1989).
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and Zweimu¨ller (2008) need to map individual goods into the three broad sectors. If they as-
sume that agricultural goods are disproportionately the goods with high weights, that services
are disproportionately the goods with low weights, and that manufacturing goods lie “in be-
tween” these two, then they can match the qualitative patterns presented earlier. As income
grows and more of the less weighted goods are consumed, one obtains a declining share for
agricultural goods, an increasing share for services, and a hump–shaped pattern for manufac-
turing. Foellmi and Zweimu¨ller can also generate balanced growth with relatively standard
assumptions. Specifically, if they assume that the weighting function on different goods has a
power form and there is constant labor augmenting technological progress that is common to the
production of all goods, then their model gives rise to a GBGP. As they discuss in their paper,
the assumption of a power function for the weighting function is analogous to the assumption
of a constant elasticity utility function in the context of the standard one–sector growth model.
Relative to the results that we derived previously about income changes and structural trans-
formation, the specification of Foellmi and Zweimu¨ller (2008) delivers balanced growth and
structural transformation in a more robust manner, in the sense that it does not need a condi-
tion similar to (30) that imposes a restriction on the parameters of preferences and technology.
Moreover, it can also deliver a hump–shaped relationship between GDP per capita and the
manufacturing shares. But a limitation of the specification of Foellmi and Zweimu¨ller (2008) is
that modeling structural transformation at the level of individual goods does not provide much
guidance for how to connect the model with data at the level of broad sectors.26
Hall and Jones (2007) also develop a framework that can give rise to non–homothetic de-
mand functions, though their focus is specifically on the rise of spending on health care, as
opposed to the more general process of structural transformation. Nonetheless this is of interest
in the current context since increases in health care account for a significant part of the overall
increase in the size of the service sector. In the basic model of Hall and Jones, utility in the
26 Buera and Kaboski (2012a, 2012b) adopt a similar preference structure as Foellmi and Zweimu¨ller (2008),
except that they stress the introduction of new goods and adjustment along the extensive margin. Other aspects of
their analysis are quite different, however. We discuss their model in more detail later in this section and again in
Subsection 7.6. For now we simply note that Buera and Kaboski (2012a) derive an explicit mapping from their
preferences to a reduced–from representation of preferences over goods and services. The interesting feature of
this mapping is that it includes a term that is analogous to our term c¯s, but rather than being a constant, its value
changes over time as technological progress occurs.
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current period is derived from a single good that represents all non–health consumption. The
period utility function is homothetic and health consumption in period t provides no direct util-
ity flow in period t but does influence the probability of survival to next period. Intuitively, this
model has features akin to the model with intensive–extensive margins that we discussed above.
Specifically, a household can adjust along the intensive margin by spending more on consump-
tion, or along the extensive margin by spending more on health care and therefore increasing
the expected number of periods in which consumption occurs. As the level of consumption
increases, the marginal utility from additional consumption at the intensive margin decreases
relative to the marginal utility of living an additional period. This can generate an increasing
expenditure share for health consumption as incomes rise, and therefore look like a model that
features a non–homothetic period utility function over health and non–health consumption.27
4.2.2 Other Specifications Emphasizing Relative Price Effects
In the Ngai–Pissarides model analyzed as Case 2 above, sectoral reallocation of factors of pro-
duction and nominal value added shares occurred as a result of relative output price changes
along the balanced growth path. Relative price changes were in turn generated by having differ-
ential rates of technological progress across sectors. The literature has also noted that relative
output price changes can result from changes in the relative prices of inputs if sectors vary in
the intensity with which they use inputs and there are changes in the relative supply of fac-
tors. In this case, one can generate structural transformation via relative price changes even if
technological change is neutral.
Two papers in the literature stress this mechanism. Caselli and Coleman (2001) focus on
skilled and unskilled workers as the two inputs of interest, noting that non–agriculture is more
skill intensive than agriculture. They argue that the effective cost of education decreased in
the first half of the 20th century, thereby increasing the relative supply of skilled workers, de-
creasing the relative price of non-agricultural goods and moving resources out of agriculture.28
Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) consider capital and labor as the two inputs of interest, and as-
27In a recent paper, Lawver (2011) uses a version of the model of the model of Hall and Jones (2007) to measure
the increase in the quality of health consumption.
28In Subsection 7.2 below, we will revisit this paper and discuss its implications for income convergence be-
tween regions.
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sume that sectors differ in their capital intensity. Since growth driven by technological change is
associated with an increase in the capital–to–labor ratio, changes in relative supplies of capital
and labor arise quite naturally.29
Here we sketch the basic idea within our benchmark model. Since the economics of the
model of Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) is closest to that of Ngai and Pissarides (2007), ex-
cept that the underlying cause of the relative price movements is different, we illustrate the
basic idea by focusing on the implications for structural transformation of differences in the
sectoral capital intensities. We assume that technological progress is uniform across the three
consumption sectors and define At by At ≡ A1−θiit for i ∈ {a,m, s}. The capital intensities differ
across sectors so that the sectoral production functions (13) become:
cit = Atk
θi
it n
1−θi
it , i ∈ {a,m, s} (40)
All other features of the environment are the same as in the benchmark model described earlier.
The first–order conditions for the stand–in firm in sector i ∈ {a,m, s} are now given by:
Rt = pitθiAt
(
kit
nit
)θi−1
(41)
Wt = pit(1 − θi)At
(
kit
nit
)θi
(42)
Dividing these equations by each other gives:
1 − θi
θi
kit
nit
=
1 − θ j
θ j
k jt
n jt
(43)
Two implications follow from this equation. First, sectors with larger capital shares have larger
capital–labor ratios; second, the capital-labor ratio grows at the same rate in all sectors.
To derive the implications for relative prices, substitute (43) into (42) and rearrange to
29In a different context, Bar and Leukhina (2010) argue that non–agriculture is more labor intensive than agri-
culture, and that the increase in population associated with the demographic transition could help explain the initial
expansion of the non–agricultural sector in the context of England during the time of the industrial revolution.
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obtain:
pit
p jt
= Ωi j
(
kit
nit
)θ j−θi
i, j ∈ {a,m, s} (44)
where Ωi j is a constant that depends on the capital shares. Since the capital–labor ratios of all
sectors grow at the same rate, equation (44) implies that for any pair of sectors, the relative
price of the sector with the higher capital share decreases as the aggregate capital stock grows.
If one assumes:
θa > θm > θs (45)
it follows that the price of services relative to manufacturing and of manufacturing relative to
agriculture will both increase over time. This implication is of course analogous to what we
derived in the context of the Ngai–Pissarides model when we assumed that γa > γm > γs.
It is important to note that the mechanism of Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) relies not only
on differences in the sectoral capital intensities, but also on the fact that with Cobb Douglas
production functions the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is equal to one.
Indeed, Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2012) have recently pointed out that the relative price of sec-
toral output depends not only on sectoral TFP and capital intensity, but also on the elasticity of
substitution between capital and labor. To see how the elasticity of substitution matters in this
context, consider first the extreme case in which capital and labor are perfect substitutes. The
capital intensity then does not matter at all for relative prices because firms can perfectly sub-
stitute labor for capital when capital is relatively expensive. In the other extreme case, capital
and labor are perfect complements and the production function is of the Leontief form. The
capital intensity then matters crucially for relative prices because one cannot substitute labor
for capital when capital is relatively expensive. More generally, the effects of Acemoglu and
Guerrieri (2008) are more important if the sectoral elasticity of substitution is smaller.
Although the specification of Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) can account for the changes
in nominal value added shares, it cannot account for the changes in real value added shares.
Moreover, it cannot generate the patterns in sectoral employment shares either.30 To see why,
30A similar issue is also present in Ngai and Pissarides (2007). We will discuss this in more detail later.
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note that using (43), it is straightforward to show that:
K =
 ∑
j=x,a,m,s
θ j
1 − θ j n j
 1 − θiθi kini (46)
Solving this expression for ki/ni and substituting the result into equation (40) gives:
cit = AtK
θi
t

θi
1 − θi∑ θ j
1−θ j n j
 nit, i ∈ {a,m, s}
In the polar case of Leontief utility, cit/c jt is constant, so the previous equation implies that
nit/n jt is constant too. For positive elasticities of substitution, changes in relative quantities
are in the opposite direction of changes in relative prices. In other words, in the model of
Acemoglu and Guerrieri there cannot be structural transformation in terms of employment that
is consistent with the fact that service employment increased at the same time as which its
relative price increased too.
One important additional difference relative to the specification of Ngai and Pissarides
(2007) is that the model of Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) has exact GBGP only asymptoti-
cally, and so the best we can hope for in this model is approximate generalized balanced growth.
Below we discuss the difference between approximate and exact generalized balanced growth
in more detail.
4.2.3 An Alternative View of Structural Transformation
In two recent papers, Buera and Kaboski (2012a, 2012b) have offered a novel representation of
structural transformation that implicitly involves elements of both of the special cases discussed
previously. Here we offer a simple version of their framework to illustrate the forces at work.
In Subsection 7.6 we discuss their specific implications in more detail.
They consider an economy in which there are a continuum of services and a continuum of
goods. For simplicity, in their economy goods are only useful as an input into the production
of services, and each good is uniquely associated with the production of a specific service.
Specifically, each good is produced using labor, and each service is produced using labor and
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its corresponding specialized good. They adopt a similar preference structure as Foellmi and
Zweimu¨ller (2008), but they assume that each service can only be consumed in the amounts of
zero or one, so that increasing consumption will necessarily manifest itself along the extensive
margin. From the consumer’s perspective all services are symmetric. Consider the following
special case of this structure as a benchmark. Assume a single household with one unit of time.
Index the continuum of goods and services by z. The technology for producing each good z
at time t is g(z) = A(t)hg(z), where A(t) captures labor augmenting technological change. The
technology for producing each service z at time t is Leontief: s(z) = min{A(t) 1ahs(z), g(z)}, where
A(t) is the same in both production functions. Because each service is consumed in amount 1,
it takes (1 + a)/A(t) units of labor to produce one unit of service, so that total consumption (i.e.,
the total number of services that are consumed) will be given by A(t)/(1 + a), and a fraction
1/(1 + a) of labor will be devoted to the goods sector. So, in this benchmark economy there is
no structural transformation in terms of labor allocations between goods and services.
Buera and Kaboski generate interesting implications in this setting by extending it along
two dimensions. First, they introduce the possibility of home produced services which also
require labor and the specialized good. To create an interesting tradeoff between the choice
of whether to produce a given service in the home or in the market, they assume that market
production of services is more efficient. This could be modeled in different ways and differs
in their two papers. To illustrate some basic workings of the model we assume that market
production takes less of the good per unit of output, but that home produced services supply a
proportionately higher utility flow. An illustrative example would be the choice between home
produced transportation services (buying a car and driving yourself) versus market provided
transportation services (buses, or taxis). While having a car increases convenience, the car will
also be idle for considerable periods. Second, they introduce heterogeneity into the production
side of the economy by assuming that higher z goods require more labor to be produced. This
heterogeneity interacts with the choice of whether to produce a given service in the market or
the home, since the more expensive it is to produce the durable, the greater is the penalty for
home production which requires more of the durable per unit of output. Whether a good is
produced in the home or the market in turn has implications for observed allocations of labor
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and market value added across market sectors, since having home produced services requires
labor from the goods sector, but will not use any labor in the market service sector. In their
model, as an economy develops the marginal services that are added represent services with
higher benefits to market versus home production. The combination of technological change
plus the changing nature of the marginal services being brought into the economy can introduce
interesting dynamics for how activity shifts between the market and home sectors. If production
shifts toward the market and away from the home, this will be recorded as an increase in the
size of the market service sector relative to the goods sector.
As noted earlier, models with these types of preferences necessarily embody a non–homothe-
ticity. But the production heterogeneity in this model implicitly acts like differential technolog-
ical growth across sectors since the marginal services that are added as an economy grows have
differing relative productivity for home versus market production. A general message from this
framework is that when thinking about growth and structural transformation it is important to
think about the new goods and services that are associated with growth, and the movement of
delivery of certain services between the home and market sectors, since the changing nature
of activities in the market sector can have important implications for the measured sectoral
allocation of market activity.
4.3 Approximate versus Exact Generalized Balanced Growth
Up to this point, our discussion has focused on analytic results concerning the possibility of
jointly having generalized balanced growth and structural transformation. This is a natural
starting point given the emphasis that the literature using the one–sector growth model places
on balanced growth and that conditions under which balanced growth results in the one–sector
model are relatively weak – constant returns to scale production with labor augmenting techni-
cal change and a period utility function with a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
The results that we have presented above for multi–sector models, however, have made it ap-
parent that the conditions for jointly having generalized balanced growth and structural trans-
formation become considerably more stringent – we now need that all production functions
are Cobb–Douglas with the same capital share, that the period utility function exhibits a uni-
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tary elasticity of substitution, and in some cases that there is a particular relationship between
preference and technology parameters. To the extent that there is good reason to believe that
many of these conditions are not satisfied, models that impose them may be missing some key
features of reality. In fact, some authors have dismissed income changes as an important source
of structural transformation on the grounds that they are consistent with generalized balanced
growth only under very fragile cross–restrictions on technology and preferences such as the one
imposed in (30).
The previous discussion suggests that it may be ill advised to insist on generalized balanced
growth in the context of structural transformation. To the extent that (generalized) balanced
growth is merely a good approximation to what we see in the data in various countries over
long periods of time, the more relevant question is whether there are specifications that can
deliver structural transformation and approximate generalized balanced growth, which may
occur under much less stringent conditions than exact generalized balanced growth.
To date there has not been much systematic analysis of the extent to which approximate
generalized balanced growth is a robust feature of multi–sector versions of the growth model
along the lines of those that we have considered. But several cases in the literature suggest
that approximate generalized balanced growth may in fact be quite robust. To begin with,
Kongsamut et al. (2001) consider numerical examples that depart from the exact conditions
needed for generalized balanced growth in their setting and find that the equilibrium path does
not deviate much from generalized balanced growth. In a similar context, Gollin et al. (2002)
study a two–sector model with subsistence consumption in the agricultural sector but not in the
other sector – a clear violation of the conditions needed to generate GBGP, but find relatively
small variations of the interest rate when their model is calibrated to match the US data over
the post 1950 period. Moreover, although the model in Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) only
has an asymptotic GBGP, the results that they report for numerical simulations suggest that the
model’s behavior along a transition path is not that different from balanced growth.
The models just discussed have the feature that asymptotically structural transformation
ceases to occur. For example, if structural transformation occurs as the result of the non–
homothetic terms c¯a and c¯s, then productivity increases will imply that in the limit the size of
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the two non–homothetic terms becomes arbitrarily small relative to consumption. Since we
observe (approximate) balanced growth and structural transformation over very long periods
in the data, it follows that any model that generates structural transformation purely while it is
converging to an exact balanced growth path must have very long lived dynamics in order to
capture reality.31
5 The Economic Forces Behind Structural Transformation:
Empirical Analysis
The previous section has focused on models that could generate (approximate) generalized bal-
anced growth and structural transformation as simultaneous outcomes. The various models
that we reviewed emphasize different theories for the reallocation of activity across sectors that
accompanies growth. In one class of theories, the key driving force is uniform technological
progress, and the key propagation mechanism comes from income effects. In another class of
theories, the key driving force is technological progress that differs across sectors and the key
propagation mechanism comes from relative price effects in consumption. In a third class of
models, the driving force is again uniform technological progress, but the propagation mecha-
nism is a combination of different capital intensities or elasticities of substitution in production
and relative price effects in consumption.
Rather than focusing narrowly on the conditions required to generate exact balanced growth,
we believe that the key to developing quantitative theories of structural transformation is to
develop quantitative assessments of the various driving forces and propagation mechanisms
that the literature has identified as potentially important. In this section we summarize the
recent progress in this effort. We break this section into two subsections. The first subsection
considers the direct evidence regarding differences in rates of technological progress, capital
intensities, and elasticities of substitution. The second subsection considers the more general
issue of the relative importance of the effects coming from changes in income and changes in
31Note that this statement does not apply to the model of Ngai and Pissarides (2007) which exhibits structural
transformation both along the exact balanced growth path and in the limit.
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relative prices.
5.1 Technological Differences Across Sectors
In this subsection we consider the evidence regarding technological differences across sectors
along the two dimensions highlighted by the previous theories: differences in technological
progress and differences in capital shares and in elasticities of substitution. We also assess the
extent to which these differences are appropriate to generate the qualitative features found in
the data regarding structural transformation.
5.1.1 Sectoral TFP Growth
Assumptions about TFP growth at the sectoral level played an important role in both of the
theories of structural transformation that we highlighted. It is therefore of interest to ask what
the empirical evidence is regarding relative growth rates in sectoral TFP. Although this would
seem to be a relatively straightforward exercise, it is actually challenging to verify the properties
of TFP growth in sectoral value added production functions in a cross–country setting. The
main reason is that calculating sectoral TFPs requires data on real value added, capital and
labor inputs, and the factor shares at the sector level. Unfortunately, these data are unavailable
for most countries. One of the many issues is that in order to compute real value added one
must have data on the real quantity of intermediate inputs, not just the value of intermediate
inputs.
One data set that has the necessary information for a set of countries is EU KLEMS.32 We
begin, therefore, by using the EU KLEMS data starting in 1970 to compute TFP in the produc-
tion of value added in agriculture, manufacturing, and services for the same set of countries as
in Section 2: Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea and the US as well as the aggregate of 10 EU
countries.33 Figure 10 plots the sectoral TFPs for these countries. Given that we are interested
in growth rates of TFP, we normalize TFP in 1990 for all sectors in all countries to be one.
32See Timmer et al. (2010), particularly the chapter on structural change, for further discussion of the details
of the EU KLEMS data on multifactor productivity. See also Duarte and Restuccia (2010) who document similar
facts about TFP as we do here.
33The 10 EU countries are the EU member states for which EU KLEMS performs growth accounting: Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
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One message that emerges from Figure 10 is that there are indeed substantial differences in the
growth rates of TFP across sectors. Moreover, we can see that the conditions of Ngai and Pis-
sarides (2007) broadly hold for Australia, Canada, the EU 10, and the United States: averaging
over the time period 1970–2007, TFP in agriculture shows the strongest growth while TFP in
services shows the weakest growth. This is exactly what is needed for the observed reallocation
of employment out of agriculture and manufacturing into the service sector in the model of
Ngai and Pissarides (2007).
While data limitations make it difficult to obtain long time series evidence on sectoral TFP
for a large sample of countries, our theory suggests an alternative method which requires fewer
data. Specifically, in the analysis of our benchmark model we highlighted the fact that if sec-
toral production functions are Cobb–Douglas with equal capital shares then there is a direct
inverse relationship in equilibrium between changes in relative prices and changes in relative
productivities. Given appropriate data on prices, one could use this relationship to infer changes
in relative productivity. Since long time series of price data is much more readily available that
the data needed to measure TFP directly, this is an appealing alternative. However, in addition
to requiring the assumption of Cobb–Douglas production functions with equal capital shares,
there are two limitations to be noted. First, in our model we assumed that technological change
was the only factor that varied over time. One can easily imagine policies or regulations that
may also affect relative prices across sectors. If these factors are important for some countries
during some periods, it may be misleading to assume that all relative price changes are driven
by changes in relative productivities. Second, although price data do exist going quite far back
in time, the price data that is required to infer relative productivity growth in value added pro-
duction functions is the price per unit of value added. In contrast, in practice most available
price indices correspond to final goods or to gross output.
Having noted these qualifications, we turn to the evidence documented by Alvarez–Cuadrado
and Poschke (2011) about time series changes in the relative price of agriculture to non–
agriculture for eleven advanced countries over the last two centuries. A key feature of these
data is that the price of agriculture relative to non–agriculture changed its behavior during the
last two centuries: while before World War II it showed an increasing trend, after World War
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Figure 10: Sectoral TFP for Selected Countries
– Time Series from EU KLEMS 1970–2007
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II it started to follow a decreasing trend. Interpreting these changes in relative prices as indica-
tive of changes in relative TFPs, the implication is that prior to World War II, TFP growth in
agriculture was actually lower than in non–agriculture.34 The period before World War II also
corresponds to the period that saw the largest movement out of agriculture. In contrast to the
findings for data since 1970, the longer time series does not seem to be consistent with relative
TFPs driving the labor reallocation from agriculture to non–agriculture.
By way of summary, we think there are two main conclusions that can be drawn from this
evidence. First, there are systematic differences in TFP growth rates across sectors. After World
War II these differences appear to be consistent with what is needed to obtain the observed
reallocation of employment out of agriculture and manufacturing into the service sector in the
model of Ngai and Pissarides (2007). Second, the differences in TFP growth rates across sectors
do not appear to be stable over very long periods of time, at least in the case of agriculture versus
non–agriculture, which does not bode too well for the models of structural transformation and
exact balanced growth that we highlighted previously.
5.1.2 Sectoral Differences in Capital Shares and Elasticities of Substitution
Next we consider the existing evidence regarding the potential role of differences in sectoral
capital shares, as emphasized by Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008), and of differences in sectoral
elasticity of substitution, as emphasized by Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2012). Herrendorf et al.
(2012a) speak to these questions by assessing how structural transformation is affected by sec-
toral differences in labor–augmenting technological progress, substitutability between capital
and labor, and capital intensity. Using postwar US data on sectoral value added, capital, and la-
bor, they estimate CES production functions and compare them with Cobb–Douglas production
functions with different and with equal capital shares. They find that: labor–augmenting tech-
nological progress is faster in agriculture than in manufacturing and faster in manufacturing
than in services; capital and labor are more easily substitutable in agriculture than in manu-
facturing and more easily substitutable in manufacturing than in services; agriculture is more
34It should be noted that the evolution of agricultural TFP in Korea between 1970 and 2007 shows a similar
u–shaped pattern (see Figure 10).
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capital–intensive than services and services are more capital intensive than manufacturing;35
The findings of Herrendorf et al. (2012a) have two implications for the importance of sec-
toral differences in capital shares and elasticity of substitution as driving forces behind structural
transformation. First, in the face of an increasing capital–to–labor ratio, differences in capital
shares cause reallocation from agriculture to manufacturing and from services to manufactur-
ing. Second, differences in the elasticity of substitution partly neutralize the differences in the
capital shares. In particular, while agriculture has by far the largest capital share it also has the
highest substitutability between capital and labor, and in fact agriculture is the only sector for
which capital and labor are more substitutable than the Cobb–Douglas case. Herrendorf et al.
(2012a) show that, as a result, sectoral differences in labor–augmenting technological progress
turn out to be the main quantitative force on the technology side behind the postwar US struc-
tural transformation, and that this force is well captured by Cobb–Douglas production functions
with equal capital shares but different TFP processes.
5.2 The Importance of Changes in Income and Relative Prices
Since the theoretical literature has emphasized the effects that result from changes in income
and relative prices, it is natural to ask what the data say about these two effects. There are two
natural and complementary approaches to this question. In the spirit of our earlier analysis, one
approach starts with a stand–in household and uses aggregate data to infer the relative impor-
tance of the two different mechanisms. The second approach uses data on individual households
to estimate properties of preferences and then assesses the implications for aggregate behavior.
In the interest of space, we will focus on the first approach, though we will briefly mention
some results from the analysis of micro data. We discuss two recent contributions: Dennis and
Iscan (2009) and Herrendorf et al. (2013). The former studies the forces leading to the move-
ment of activity out of agriculture in the United States over the last two centuries, whereas the
latter focuses specifically on the reallocation of activity across all three sectors in the United
States since 1947. We describe each in turn.
35In order to avoid confusion, we stress that these capital shares refer to value added, and not to final expenditure.
The capital shares for final expenditure at the sector level can be found in a related paper, Valentinyi and Herrendorf
(2008).
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5.2.1 The Movement out of Agriculture in the US since 1800
Dennis and Iscan (2009) seek to assess the relative importance of income effects, relative TFP
growth and capital deepening on the movement of labor out of agriculture in the US over the
last two centuries. Their framework is very similar to our benchmark model with the exception
of three details. First, they have only two sectors, agriculture and non–agriculture. Second,
they assume that all investment comes from the non–agricultural sector. Third, they do not
impose that the capital share is the same in both sectors. Initially, Dennis and Iscan write the
utility function as the two–sector analogue of our utility function, but in their empirical analysis
they also allow for the possibility that the subsistence term c¯a changes over time. Given our
earlier discussion, we note that while this general specification is not consistent with generalized
balanced growth, it captures the basic forces that the theoretical literature has emphasized.
Dennis and Iscan (2009) derive an equilibrium relationship that expresses the share of la-
bor devoted to agriculture as a function of three factors, which in turn reflect income effects
through the subsistence term, relative productivity effects via differential growth rates of TFP,
and capital deepening effects. Expressed in terms of our notation, this equilibrium relationship
is:36
1 − nat = 1 − sa(cat)1 + pR(Aat, Ant)sk(kat, knt)sX(cnt, Xt) (47)
where
sa(cat) =
c¯a
cat
, pR(Aat, Ant) =
ωa
ωn
(
Ant
Aat
)1−ε
,
sk(kat, knt) =
(
1 − θa
1 − θn
)ε (kθnnt
kθaat
)1−ε
, sX(cnt, Xt) =
Xt
cnt + Xt
.
The term 1−sa(cat) captures the income effect that operates through the subsistence term c¯a. The
terms pR(Aat, Ant) and sk(kat, knt) capture the relative price effects that arises from differential
technological progress and capital deepening, respectively, while the term sX(cnt, Xt) captures
the effects associated with changes in the investment rate.
36We use the index n for the non–agricultural sector.
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Dennis and Iscan (2009) calibrate the key parameters of the model (elasticity of substitution,
subsistence terms, preference weights, and capital shares) and then assess the extent to which
equation (47) holds in the data. In particular, they substitute actual values into the right–hand
side of equation (47), solve for the implied share of labor allocated to agriculture and compare
this to the actual series from the data. To assess the importance of the different factors they
carry out the same exercise but only allow one of the factors to change over time.
The main findings of Dennis and Iscan (2009) are as follows. First, the model does a
reasonable job of capturing the time series changes in the employment share of agriculture
since 1800. If the value of c¯a is held fixed throughout, the model somewhat under–predicts
the employment share for agriculture in the 1800s, but does fine in the post 1950 period. A
small time trend in c¯a over the period 1800–1950 yields a better fit over the entire period.
Second, prior to 1950 the income effect is the dominant factor in accounting for the movement
of employment out of agriculture, whereas the relative productivity effect is working in the
opposite direction. Only in the post 1950 period do the effects of relative productivity and
capital deepening play even a modest role in accounting for the change in the employment share
of agriculture. They also consider various extensions to their analysis, such as incorporating
trade, and they show that the results are robust to these extensions.
We want to stress three key implications of the results of Dennis and Iscan (2009). First, the
fact that their model does a reasonable job of capturing the movement of labor out of agriculture
over a long time period suggests that our benchmark model is sufficiently rich to capture some
key features in the data. Second, the fact that a time varying subsistence term, c¯at, improves the
model’s ability to account for the movement out of agriculture is notable, and suggests that a
deeper theory of how income effects arise may be warranted. Third, at least for the movement
of labor out of agriculture in the United States, income effects are effectively the sole driving
force behind this decline; even though the other factors play a role after 1950, this occurs when
almost all of the decline in the employment share for agriculture has already happened.
It is also relevant to note some limitations of the analysis in Dennis and Iscan (2009). First,
it only focuses on the movement of labor out of agriculture and does not address the issue of
what forces shape the allocation of employment between manufacturing and services. Second,
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all of their results come from a calibration exercise, but there is little direct evidence on some
of the key parameters they use for this exercise. Additionally, they connect their model to
the data in a somewhat inconsistent fashion, in that they interpret their production functions
as value added production functions, but when they look at consumption of agriculture they
interpret it as consumption of final goods. In the next subsection, we discuss in detail why this
is inconsistent. Third, they focus only on the changes in employment shares, and so do not
address the issue of the discrepancy between value added shares and employment shares that
we documented earlier. Nonetheless, we think that this paper makes an important contribution
to the effort to identify the key economic forces behind structural transformation.
A related exercise was carried out by Buera and Kaboski (2009). Specifically, they assessed
the ability of a calibrated version of our three–sector benchmark model to account for the broad
patterns of structural transformation in the US from the 1800s to the present. One difficulty
that they noted was the ability of the model to account for the acceleration in the nominal value
added share of the service sector in the post World War II period.
5.2.2 Structural Transformation in the US since 1947
Herrendorf et al. (2013) offer a related but distinct approach to uncovering the importance of
income and relative price effects in accounting for structural transformation. In contrast to
Dennis and Iscan (2009), who considered the allocation of employment between agriculture
and non–agriculture in the US since 1800, Herrendorf et al. (2013) consider the reallocation
among consumption expenditure shares for all three sectors in the US since 1947. Specifically,
starting with a stand–in household, they asked whether the utility function in (1) provides a
good fit to the US data on expenditure shares in the post World War II period, and if so, what
this implies for the values of the key parameters c¯a, c¯s and ε, and the implied importance of
income and relative price effects.
Although this seems to be a simple question, Herrendorf et al. (2013) argued that the ques-
tion is not even properly specified. The reason for this is related to the difference between value
added and final expenditure, which we have previously discussed. In particular, if one inter-
prets the sectoral production functions as value added production functions then the arguments
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of the utility function necessarily represent the corresponding consumption of sectoral value
added. In terms of our previous example of the purchase of a cotton shirt, this implies that
the shirt is broken into three value added pieces, each of which the household values as they
contribute to the three different categories of value added. Herrendorf et al call this the value
added approach. Alternatively, one may interpret the commodities in the utility function as
final expenditure categories, as is typically done in household expenditure studies. The outputs
of the production functions must then be viewed as final expenditure rather than value added.
In terms of the purchase of a cotton shirt, the consumer simply derives utility from the shirt as
a whole as it contributes to the single category of manufacturing consumption. Herrendorf et al
call this the final expenditure approach. It is important to note that there is no right or wrong
in terms of these two approaches. From the perspective of preferences, these are simply two
different ways of aggregating across the many characteristics that consumers value. As is true
with any attempt to aggregate individual characteristics into broader groups, one can imagine
examples where one approach seems preferable.
The choice of interpretation matters if the relative prices and quantities are not the same for
the two different interpretations. In particular, even if the two different approaches display sim-
ilar qualitative properties in terms of changes over time, differences in quantitative properties
may have important implications for parameters of the utility function and the importance of
income and relative price effects. Herrendorf et al. (2013) carry out the manipulations necessary
to have consistent sets of data for the two approaches and they provide the following answers.
One possible outcome from this exercise is that one of the approaches provides a better fit to
the data, in which case one might use this as evidence in support of one approach over the other.
However, Herrendorf et al. (2013) found that for both approaches the preferences represented
by (1) yield very good fits to the postwar US data on relative prices and expenditure shares.
However, the two approaches yield very different parameter estimates for the utility functions
and very different assessments of the relative importance of the effects of relative prices and
income.
For the final expenditure approach, income effects are the dominant source of changes in
expenditure shares, and the Stone–Geary utility function (28) of Kongsamut et al. (2001) pro-
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vides a good fit to the data.37 For the value added approach, it turns out that relative price effects
are a much more important source of changes in expenditure shares. Moreover, the homothetic
Leontief utility function mincat ,cmt ,cst{ωacat, ωmcmt, ωscst}, which results in ε = c¯a = c¯s = 0, pro-
vides a reasonable fit to the data. Interestingly, this utility function is a special case of the class
of inelastic CES utility functions that Ngai and Pissarides (2007) considered.38
It is important to emphasize what these results mean. They are not an example of researchers
obtaining different estimates for a given parameter from different data sets, suggesting that fur-
ther work is needed to narrow down the set of possible values. Instead, the implication is that
there are two different ways to interpret commodities in the utility function in multi–sector
models. It turns out that being explicit about which interpretation is adopted is of critical im-
portance, in that it has implications for what data is required to connect the model with the data,
and as just shown, this has very important implications for implied preference parameters. Fur-
thermore, note that the two approaches are just two different aggregate representations of the
same underlying economic data. The key message is that one cannot talk about the importance
of income or relative price effects as drivers of structural transformation without specifying
what representation of the data one is adopting. What shows up as income effects in one rep-
resentation may manifest itself as relative price effects in the other representation. Different
representations are connected via the complex input–output relationships in the economy. Her-
rendorf et al. (2013) show how one can construct the mapping between the two representations
for a given input–output structure.
We stress two key results. First, the fact that the model is able to account for changes in
expenditure shares for the US since 1947 is again support for the parsimonious model that we
have adopted as our benchmark. Second, it highlights that empirical researchers working with
multi–sector models must take care to be explicit about how commodities in utility functions
are to be interpreted. Different interpretations have dramatically different implications for how
37Many other papers have estimated linear expenditure systems implied by the Stone–Geary utility specification.
A review of this literature is Blundell (1988).
38While Buera and Kaboski (2009) independently reached the conclusion that a low σ is required to match value
added data, they also found that the benchmark model cannot account for the increase of the share of services in
the last thirty years. Herrendorf et al. (2013) show that the reason for the different conclusions is that Buera and
Kaboski (2009) assume that all investment is produced in manufacturing. This implies that they do not take into
account that the investments produced in services have risen sharply since World War III.
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the models are to be connected with the data and what the implied parameters of the utility
function.
One of the limitations of this study is that it only focuses on the post 1947 period for the
US, and this is a period in which the US has already experienced much of the reallocation out
of agriculture. While it is of interest to extend this type of analysis to longer time periods and
different countries, a key issue is data availability.39
6 Extensions of the Benchmark Model
In this section we discuss relaxing three features present in the analysis of the benchmark model.
The first is the assumption that there is no international trade (“closed economy”). The second
is the assumption of that there is no cost of moving labor across sectors (“perfect labor mobil-
ity”). The third is the assumption that there are no costs of moving goods across sectors (“zero
transportation costs”).
6.1 International Trade
Thus far our theoretical analysis has taken place under the assumption of a closed economy. A
key implication of being a closed economy is that the production of each of the four sectors
must equal the corresponding household choices (either of investment or of one of the three
consumption goods). The equality between sectoral productions and consumption/investment
played a key role in generating the results concerning structural transformation that we obtained
in the benchmark model. For example, in the model of Ngai and Pissarides (2007), we saw that
labor moved out of the consumption sector that had the highest productivity growth because
of the household’s desire to maintain the composition of its consumption allocation (inelastic
demand). In the model of Kongsamut et al. (2001), technological progress was uniform across
sectors, but labor moved out of agriculture because of the household’s desire to change the com-
39This is relevant for the analysis of Buera and Kaboski (2009). They carry out a calibration exercise for the US
over a longer time period, but need to use different sources for relative prices in the pre 1947 period. Given that
prices for value added consumption and final consumption are quite different in the post 1947 period and have very
different implications for preference parameters, an issue arises with how to interpret results that use a mixture of
prices.
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position of its consumption allocation towards manufactured goods and services (differences in
income elasticities).
In this subsection we discuss the extent to which openness changes the results about struc-
tural transformation. We begin with the simple observation that the competitive equilibrium
of a model in which all commodities are tradeable without costs will have a complete sep-
aration between the decisions of firms and households. This observation implies that in an
open–economy version of our benchmark model without trade costs the production measures
of structural transformation (i.e. employment and value added shares) would generically follow
a different pattern than the consumption expenditure share. This is relevant because, as we have
documented in Section 2, there is a discrepancy between production and consumption shares in
some instances, most notably for the share of manufacturing in Korea.
Matsuyama (2009) was the first to analytically work out the idea of the previous paragraph
for a simple two–country model. He abstracts from capital and considers a Stone–Geary util-
ity function over the three consumption goods food, manufactured goods, and services. He
assumes that agricultural goods are an endowment whereas manufactured goods and services
are produced with technologies that are linear in labor, and that agricultural and manufactured
goods can be traded with the rest of the world at zero trade costs whereas services cannot be
traded. Matsuyama shows two results for this simple model. First, if there is technological
progress in manufacturing then the total manufacturing labor of both countries declines. Sec-
ond, if one of the two countries experiences stronger technological progress in manufacturing
than the other, then manufacturing labor in the first country may initially increase while manu-
facturing labor in the second country decreases unambiguously. Eventually, when technological
progress in the manufacturing sector has been sufficiently strong, the share of manufacturing
labor in the first country will decrease also. These results suggest that a hump–shaped rela-
tionship may occur in the country which experiences the stronger technological progress in
manufacturing.
Yi and Zhang (2010) generalize the idea of Matsuyama to a two–country version of our
benchmark model of structural transformation, in which all goods are produced with labor only.
The assumption that agricultural and manufactured goods are tradeable without costs would
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then lead to the counterfactual implication that each country specializes in either agriculture
or manufacturing. They therefore assume that each of the three sectors is the aggregate of a
continuum of goods as in Eaton and Kortum (2002). Yi and Zhang (2010) simulate their model
under the assumption that one country has higher productivity growth in manufacturing than
the other country. They provides examples for which the country with the higher productivity
growth in manufacturing experiences a hump shape in the shares of manufacturing employment
and value added while the other country experiences a downward sloping shape in the shares of
manufacturing labor and value added.
From the empirical perspective it is of interest to ask whether there is evidence for the
effects of openness on structural transformation, besides the hump shape of manufacturing
employment and value added. One clear prediction of the models of Matsuyama (2009) and
Yi and Zhang (2010) is that the labor shares of sectors that produce tradeable goods should
differ across countries that have different sectoral productivities. In Section 2 we noted that
there was some evidence of dispersion in sectoral labor shares across countries in the Euro-
pean Union and Japan, with Germany and Japan having unusually large share of manufacturing
hours worked and Korea having an unusually large share of real manufactured value added.
Betts et al. (2011), Sposi (2011), and Teignier (2012) study the role of international trade in
Korea’s industrialization. They find that international trade played a crucial role for the rapid
rise in the manufacturing value added and employment shares. Teignier (2012) finds in addition
that international trade could have played a much larger role if South Korea had not introduced
agricultural protection policies. While such a story may be consistent with various accounts
regarding the importance of trade in the development of South Korea, it is hard to reconcile
with the patterns we found in Section 2. Specifically, we found there that South Korea did not
display any distinctive behavior for the labor allocations.
We conclude that the effects of openness on structural transformation show up in a discrep-
ancy between production and consumption in sectors that trade with the rest of the world. In
the past, this applied to manufacturing, and to a lesser extent to agriculture. In recent years,
however, there has been an increasing trend toward trade in services. An open question moving
forward concerns the extent to which increased trade in services will influence the nature of
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structural transformation. For example, will increased trade in services hasten the movement
of resources out of manufacturing in a country like the US which has relatively high produc-
tivity in many service industries, and is therefore thought to have a comparative advantage in
services?
6.2 Labor Mobility
Our benchmark model assumed that labor was homogeneous and could be allocated across
sectors without any labor mobility costs. There are several interesting issues that arise when
there are labor mobility costs. In this subsection we discuss the most relevant ones.
We begin with the paper by Lee and Wolpin (2006) about the large reallocation of labor
from manufacturing to services in the United States over the period from 1968 to 2000. The
goals of this paper are to measure the costs associated with sectoral labor reallocation and to
assess the relative importance of labor demand and supply factors for sectoral labor realloca-
tion, where labor demand factors are defined as changes in sectoral productivity and relative
prices and labor supply factors are defined as changes in demographics, fertility, and educa-
tional attainment. To reach these goals, they develop a framework with a detailed labor market.
To begin with, there are three occupational choices in each sector: blue collar, white collar,
and pink collar (i.e., secretarial, clerical etc.). Moreover, workers differ in their educational at-
tainment and they can accumulate sector–specific and occupation–specific human capital while
working. Lastly, there are various types of technological change and the production functions
have a constant elasticity of substitution between capital and labor.
Lee and Wolpin (2006) estimate their model using micro data. Their main findings are as
follows. First, labor demand factors are the key driving forces behind the reallocation of labor
across sectors. In contrast, labor supply factors do not play much of a role. This finding is
consistent with the emphasis that our benchmark model puts on technological factors. Second,
and in contrast to our benchmark model, the mobility costs associated with moving across
sectors are large; for example, the monetary cost of changing sectors can be as large as 75
percent of annual earnings. Moreover, changing occupations within a sector is significantly
less costly than changing sectors while maintaining the same occupation.
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Lee and Wolpin (2006) carry out several counterfactuals regarding how changes in mobility
costs would have affected the evolution of labor market outcomes. Interestingly, they find that
if mobility costs had been zero, aggregate productivity would have been higher and the labor
market histories of individual workers would have been different, but the evolution of sectoral
employment shares and value added shares would not have changed much. The economics
behind this result is that with lower mobility costs workers can better allocate their time to the
sector in which their idiosyncratic productivity is highest. This raises aggregate productivity
and changes the labor market histories of individual workers. However, since it leads to flows
of workers in both directions, the effect on relative sectoral employment is relatively small.
This result suggests that abstracting from mobility costs in our benchmark model does not have
large quantitative effects on the sectoral employment allocation.
Lee and Wolpin (2006) also ask what would have happened if sectoral labor mobility had
been more costly. They find that while there would have been little effect on trend changes in
employment shares, the level of the employment share of services would have shifted upward.
This result runs counter to the intuition that increased mobility costs will decrease the flow of
workers into the expanding service sector. To understand this, it is important to realize that
this intuition is based on how mobility costs affect the response to an unanticipated shock. In
contrast, what matters for Lee and Wolpin’s exercise are the choices that forward looking new
entrants make in the face of the trend that the service sector is becoming more attractive in
comparison to the goods sector. If we increase the size of mobility costs, then more entrants
move directly into the service sector, instead of first going to the manufacturing sector and later
switching to the service sector.
There is more evidence that the role of new entrants is crucial for the labor reallocation
across sectors in the context of structural transformation. For example, Kim and Topel (1995)
show that during Korea’s rapid industrialization almost all of the changes in the sectoral em-
ployment shares of agriculture and manufacturing resulted from changes in the behavior of new
entrants. As a result, the large decrease in the agricultural employment share and the large
increase in the manufacturing employment share were accomplished with little reallocation of
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existing workers.40 To the extent that new entrants are an important source of labor market
flexibility one might conjecture that economies with different rates of growth in the labor force
might experience different patterns of structural transformation. However, we are not aware of
existing evidence that supports this conjecture.
While some mobility costs might reflect technological factors, there is also the possibility
that policies, regulations and institutional factors lead to the barriers to labor mobility. Exam-
ples include implicit or explicit firing costs levied on employers, subsidies to establishments in
declining industries, entry barriers that make it costly for firms to start up new establishments,
generous unemployment benefits or early retirement schemes that are offered to displaced work-
ers, and direct restrictions on the mobility of workers.41 There are many studies of these types
of factors, but most of them make no reference to the process of structural transformation. The
reason for this is that most job creation and destruction occurs within rather than across narrow
industrial classifications, and so the main effects come from the reallocation of resources across
establishments when jobs are created and destructed.
Three exceptions that study the effects of labor mobility costs in the context of structural
transformation are Nickell et al. (2002), Messina (2006) and Hayashi and Prescott (2008). Nick-
ell et al. (2002) examine the correlations between sectoral composition and various policy and
institutional factors in a panel data set panel of 14 OECD countries and 5 one-digit industries
during the period 1975–94. One of their findings is that countries with more stringent em-
ployment protection policies have larger industrial sectors, suggesting that employment protec-
tion policies might impede the reallocation of employment from manufacturing into services.
Messina (2006) considers the role of entry barriers. One distinguishing feature of structural
transformation in Europe is that conditional on aggregate productivity (i.e., output/hour), Eu-
rope has a much lower employment share for services than do other rich countries.42 Messina
argues that this is the result of higher entry barriers in Europe, including such factors as direct
costs associated with licensing and indirect costs associated with zoning restrictions or regula-
40Matsuyama (1992) and Rogerson (2006) both present models of sectoral reallocation that have this property.
41China is a clear example of an economy that has direct restrictions on the mobility of workers. Dekle and
Vandenbroucke (2012) that these restrictions slowed the Chinese movement out of agriculture.
42This was not apparent in Section 2 since we plotted the service share of hours worked versus per capita income
rather than output per hour.
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tions that restrict shopping hours, etc. Because the reallocation of workers into services requires
additional entry of establishments into the service sector, these barriers retard the movement of
economic activity into the service sector. Hayashi and Prescott (2008) study the movement of
labor out of agriculture in Japan before World War II. They argue that the prewar patriarchy
that forced the son designated as heir to stay in agriculture effectively amounted to a barrier to
the movement of labor out of the agriculture sector. Using a standard neoclassical two–sector
growth model, they show that the barrier–induced sectoral distortion and the implied lack of
capital accumulation account well for the depressed output level of Japan’s prewar economy.
Although Lee and Wolpin (2006) incorporated a range of factors that make mobility costly
for individual workers, their model still shares the feature of our benchmark model that all
labor reallocation was voluntary from the perspective of the worker. A large literature has
documented the large earnings losses that older workers face when they are displaced; see, for
example, Jacobson et al. (1993). To many policymakers and commentators, the reallocation of
labor from manufacturing to services that is part of the process of structural transformation is
synonymous with the displacement of older, high–tenure workers in the manufacturing sector
and either unemployment or large losses in earnings. While the connection may seem clear
cut, direct evidence on this point is much less clear cut. As noted by many authors, most job
creation and destruction occurs within narrow industry classifications, and so is not directly
related to the reallocation of activity across broad sectors.43
6.3 Goods Mobility
If openness matters for the process of structural transformation in some settings then it follows
that the cost of moving goods may influence structural transformation as well through their
effect on trade. More interesting is the possibility that transport costs might influence structural
transformation in a closed economy setting. One simple idea in this literature stems from
noting that while agriculture is predominantly rural, much of the activity outside of agriculture
takes place in cities. It follows that food consumed by non–agricultural workers needs to be
transported from rural to urban areas. If this is the case then high costs of moving food from
43See for example Davis and Haltiwanger (1992).
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rural areas could exert a negative influence on the movement of labor out of agriculture.
Herrendorf et al. (2012b) study this idea in the context of the transport revolution in the
US before the civil war, during which the construction of the railroads reduced dramatically
the transportation costs to the most fertile farm land in the Midwest. They build a model with
two regions (Midwest and Northeast) and three sectors (agriculture, manufacturing, services).
Consistent with our benchmark model, their model also allows for both income effects via a
subsistence term in the utility from agriculture, and productivity effects in terms of the factors
that determine the allocation of labor to agriculture. They show that the reduction in transporta-
tion costs between the two regions leads to the settlement of the most fertile farm land in the
Midwest, which is followed by a reduction in the agricultural labor force.
Adamopoulos (2011) and Gollin and Rogerson (2010) study this idea further in the context
of a static model with agriculture and non–agriculture and different locations. Adamopoulos
shows that transportation costs between locations can exert an important influence on the allo-
cation of resources across locations and between agriculture and non–agriculture. Gollin and
Rogerson carry out some numerical exercises to suggest that there is a strong interaction be-
tween increases in productivity and reductions in transportation costs in terms of their impact
on labor moving out of agriculture.
7 Applications of Structural Transformation
In this section we return to the question we posed in the introduction to this chapter: Does
incorporating structural transformation into the standard growth model deliver new insights?
In other words, is there a substantive payoff to working with versions of the growth model
that account for structural transformation? We discuss several issues where changes in the
sectoral composition of the economy matter has been shown to matter. We conclude that explicit
modeling of structural transformation offers important additional insights in these cases.
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7.1 Structural Transformation and Economic Development
Caselli (2005) and Restuccia et al. (2008) argue that the proximate cause of much of the large
differences in living standards across countries is attributable to two simple facts: (1) develop-
ing countries are much less productive in agriculture relative to developed countries, and (2)
developing countries devote much more of their labor to agriculture than do developed coun-
tries. These two facts suggest that in order to understand why developing countries are so poor
it is of first–order importance to understand the forces that shape the allocation of resources be-
tween agriculture and the other sectors. A version of the growth model extended to incorporate
structural transformation is the natural framework to be used in this context.
Work by Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2002, 2007) illustrates how low agricultural pro-
ductivity can be the source of large cross–country differences in aggregate productivity. For
ease of exposition we focus on the simpler presentation in the 2002 paper, which uses a two–
sector version of our benchmark model, with the two sectors being agriculture and non–agricult-
ure. They assume that the population is constant and normalize it to one. Preferences are such
that there is a subsistence level c¯a of agricultural consumption at which individuals are also
satiated. The non–agricultural production function is essentially a Cobb–Douglas production
function in capital and labor. In contrast, there are two agricultural production functions: a tra-
ditional and a modern one.44 Both agricultural production functions are linear in labor, though
the analysis would be unaffected by assuming a fixed quantity of land and decreasing returns to
scale in labor. The traditional production is assumed to be the same across countries and to be
sufficiently productive to exactly meet subsistence agricultural needs when all labor is allocated
to it. The modern production function has a country–specific TFP parameter and it is the only
production function that is subject to technological progress.
In this model, only the agricultural technology with the larger productivity will be used in
equilibrium. Initially this is the traditional technology. Since the modern technology is sub-
ject to technological progress, at some point the modern technology will replace the traditional
technology as the only technology that will be used. The somewhat extreme structure of the
model then yields a very simple solution method for determining the equilibrium. Total food
44Hansen and Prescott (2002) use a similar assumption but at the aggregate level.
77
production must be c¯a. As long as the traditional technology is used, this means that all labor
will be in agriculture. When the modern technology starts to dominate the traditional tech-
nology, labor will start to flow from agriculture to non–agriculture. With the time series for
labor allocations determined, the remainder of the model becomes a standard growth model
with an exogenously given process for labor. The growth rate of labor in the non–agricultural
sector is completely determined by the exogenous growth rate of labor productivity in the mod-
ern agricultural sector. Since all countries have the same output of agriculture, cross–country
differences in aggregate output are entirely driven by differences in non–agricultural output.
Several implications follow. First, countries that use the modern technology in agriculture
but have low productivity in it will have to devote more labor to agriculture. This leads to less
labor, and capital, in non–agriculture, and hence to less aggregate output. Given the observed
differences in the share of labor that is allocated to agriculture, Gollin et al. (2002) show that this
mechanism can account for a large part of the cross–country differences in aggregate output.
This is interesting because in their model the only difference across countries is the level of
productivity of agriculture.
Second, assuming that productivity growth rates are constant over time, the model necessar-
ily implies that transition dynamics will be long–lived, thereby addressing a point emphasized
by King and Rebelo (1993) that in a standard one–sector growth model transition to the steady
state capital level is rapid.45 This point does not carry over to the two–sector model because
labor allocated to the non–agricultural sector only slowly converges to its asymptotic level.
Third, the model implies that in a closed economy setting advances in agricultural productivity
are a precondition for growth. This view was a central argument of Schultz (1953), and figured
prominently in later contributions by Johnston and Mellor (1961), Johnston and Kilby (1975),
and Timmer (1988), among others. More recently, it has taken a central state in the writing of
non–economists such as Diamond (1997).46
Laitner (2000) considers a similar framework as Gollin et al. (2002) but focuses on a differ-
45Chang and Hornstein (2011) make a related point about Korea. They show that two modifications of the one–
sector growth model are essential to account for the long–lived transition dynamics since 1960 during which Korea
continued to accumulate capital. The first one is to distinguish between agriculture and non–agriculture and to take
into account that Korean agriculture used relatively little physical capital. The second essential modification is to
model that the relative price of capital remained high during most of the transition dynamics.
46See Tiffin and Irz (2006) for a recent empirical assessment.
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ent issue. He notes that in the time series data there is evidence of an increase in savings rates
early in the industrialization process. Whereas some have argued that the increase in savings
rate is the driving force behind the industrialization process, Laitner shows that, in a model
of structural transformation, this apparent increase in savings rate is simply an artifact of how
NIPA measures saving. Early in the development process most labor is employed in agriculture,
and so most savings take the form of realized capital gains in the value of land, which is not
recorded as savings by the NIPA. As labor moves out of agriculture and agriculture becomes
a smaller part of aggregate output, this issue becomes less important quantitatively. Laitner
argues that viewed from the perspective of his model of structural transformation, one should
not attach any significance to the apparent increase in savings rates that occur in the early stages
of development.
7.2 Structural Transformation and Regional Income Convergence
One of the dramatic secular changes in the US economy over the post World War II period is
the convergence of incomes across regions; see, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992).
In the context of the standard one–sector neoclassical growth model, this convergence in in-
comes would be attributed to changes in either regional TFP or regional factor accumulation.
Caselli and Coleman (2001) show that a model of structural transformation provides a richer
understanding of the economic forces at work. The motivation for their analysis is provided
by the fact that the convergence in regional incomes between the North and the South of the
United States coincided with a dramatic narrowing of regional differences in the employment
share in agriculture. They use a model that differs from our benchmark model along several
dimensions. First, they consider a two–sector version of the model, with the two sectors be-
ing agriculture and non–agriculture. Second, they consider a two–region version of the model,
where each region has the same structure as our model and there is free mobility of goods across
regions. They assume that the technologies are such that the North has a comparative advantage
in manufacturing and the South has a comparative advantage in agriculture. They focus on the
special case in which the technologies in manufacturing are the same in both regions and the
South has higher in TFP agriculture (for simplicity, they assume that the North has zero TFP in
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agriculture). Third, they assume that there are mobility costs in terms of sectoral reallocation
of labor. Specifically, all workers begin in the agricultural sector, and they must pay a cost if
they are to move to the non–agricultural sector. They interpret this mobility cost as the cost of
acquiring skills that are needed in the non–agricultural sector and argue that it is necessary if
one is to account for the secular changes in labor allocations and relative wages.
The basic economics of their analysis is the following. When the United States was rel-
atively poor, more of its workers were engaged in agriculture, due to non–homothetic prefer-
ences which imply a large share for agricultural expenditures at low levels of income. Because
the South had a comparative advantage in agriculture, the South was doing relatively more
agriculture. Because of mobility costs, wages were higher in non–agriculture. Putting these
features together, incomes were lower in the South. Over time, production technology in non–
agriculture advanced, leading to a decline in the share of workers in agriculture. They also posit
that in addition mobility costs decreased, therefore leading to convergence between agricultural
and non–agricultural wages.47
7.3 Structural Transformation and Aggregate Productivity Trends
Our model of structural transformation allows for the possibility that different sectors have dif-
ferent levels as well as growth rates of labor productivity. Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2012)
provide evidence from the 1996 Benchmark Study of the Penn World Tables on sectoral TFP
differences across countries. They find that there are large sectoral TFP differences relative to
the United States not only in agriculture, but also in manufacturing, and that the sectoral TFP
differences in these two sectors are much larger than in the service sector. Aggregate labor
productivity may then be affected by the sectoral composition of the economy. In particular, to
the extent that different countries are at different stages of the process of structural transforma-
tion, sectoral reallocation associated with structural transformation could generate significant
changes in aggregate productivity growth [Echevarria (1997)]. In principle, episodes of acceler-
ation or slowdown in aggregate productivity growth may occur even if in each country sectoral
47In related work, Hnatkovska and Lahiri (2012) show that structural transformation importantly contributed to
the narrowing of the urban–rural wage gap in India during 1983–2010.
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productivities are growing at constant rates.
In a recent paper, Duarte and Restuccia (2010) have investigated the importance of these
effects in a sample of 29 countries for the period of 1956–2004. They employed a somewhat
simplified version of our benchmark model in which labor is the only factor of production (and
production functions are linear in labor). They assumed that each sector’s labor productivity
grows at a constant rate, but that level and growth rates differ across economies as dictated by
the data.
The preference structure of Duarte and Restuccia (2010) assumes a period utility function
which is a two–good version of (28):
Ct = ω log (cat − c¯a) + ωn log (cnt)
cnt stands for non–agricultural consumption and it is a CES aggregator of manufactured goods
and services. Preference parameters are calibrated so as to match the behavior of the US econ-
omy and are assumed to be the same across countries. The initial productivity levels of all
countries relative to the US are inferred from the model by requiring that it match the observed
employment shares in the initial period. Inputting the sectoral productivity growth rates from
the data, Duarte and Restuccia (2010) then simulate the model and compute the implied series
for aggregate labor productivity.
Even though their model assumes constant productivity growth rates at the sectoral level
of each country, it generates large movements in relative aggregate productivity across coun-
tries over time. Key to this finding is that differences in the levels and growth rates of labor
productivity between rich and poor countries are larger in agriculture and services than in man-
ufacturing. This implies that during the process of structural transformation, the reallocation
of labor from agriculture to manufacturing led to a catch up of aggregate productivity rela-
tive to the US, and the reallocation from manufacturing to services leads to a falling behind of
aggregate productivity relative to the US.
In related research, Bah and Brada (2009) study the countries from Central Europe which
have recently entered the European Union. The point of departure of their analysis is the
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stylized fact that central planning during communist times resulted in “over–agrarianism” and
“over–industrialization”, and the neglect of the service sector in these countries. Bah and Brada
document that even today employment in the service sector is considerably smaller in Central
Europe than in the core countries of the European Union. Moreover, they find that in all of
these countries the service sector has lower TFP than the manufacturing sector. This implies
that structural transformation into the service sector will lead to losses in GDP per capita, unless
reforms are implemented that make the service sectors more productive.
7.4 Structural Transformation and Hours Worked
Following Prescott (2004), there is a sizeable literature that seeks to understand the large differ-
ences in hours worked that have emerged over time between the US and countries in continental
Europe. In order to be able to compare hours worked across countries of different size, Prescott
divided total hours worked by the working–age population. Prescott used the standard one–
sector growth model to demonstrate that changes in labor taxes could account for much of the
emerging difference.
Rogerson (2008) argued that a model of structural transformation provides additional in-
sights into the evolution of hours. In particular, he compared the evolution of hours worked per
working–age person in the US to those in an aggregate of five continental European economies
(Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands) since 1956. Whereas hours worked were about
5% higher in Europe in 1956, by 2003 they were more than 30% lower. Looking at the sectoral
evolution of hours worked reveals an interesting pattern. During the period in which hours
worked in these European economies fell by more than 35% relative to the US, one observes
that the relative level of hours worked in the goods sector in Europe fell dramatically, whereas
the relative level of hours worked in services remained relatively flat.48 One might be tempted
to conclude that the key to understanding the relative decline in hours worked in Europe lies
in understanding the relative decline in hours worked in the goods sector. However, when one
views the sectoral evolution of hours worked in the context of structural transformation one is
lead to exactly the opposite conclusion. Specifically, in 1956 Europe was considerably behind
48Hours worked in a sector again is defined as total hours worked divided by the working–age population.
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the US in terms of development, and consistent with our earlier empirical analysis, had a larger
share of hours in the goods sector and a smaller share in the service sector than the United
States. By 2003 Europe has basically caught up to the United States in terms of productivity.
Holding all else constant, one would expect that the sectoral hours worked distribution in Eu-
rope in 2003 would look similar to that in the United States. That is, the process of structural
transformation leads us to expect that while hours in the goods sector in Europe should have
decreased relative to the US, hours in the service sector in Europe should in fact have increased.
Put somewhat differently, the issue of understanding why hours worked are so much lower in
Europe reduces to the issue of understanding why the European service sector has failed to
grow like its counterpart in the US. In fact, this dynamic was apparent in the hours plots in
Figure 2.
In addition to simplifying the analysis by aggregating agriculture and manufacturing to
one category and by abstracting from capital, Rogerson’s model differs from our benchmark
model along two key dimensions: he adds a labor supply decision and he allows for home
production, which he assumes to be substitutable with the output of the service sector. His
model combines both income and price effects to generate structural transformation. Taking
changes in productivity and labor taxes as given, he calibrates the preference parameters so as
to match the changes in the US economy between 1956 and 2003, including the change in time
devoted to home production.49 He then feeds in European values for productivity and taxes in
both 1956 and 2003 and examines the ability of the model to account for aggregate and sectoral
observations in Europe in 1956 and 2003. Overall, Rogerson finds that the model accounts well
for the sectoral European labor allocations.
Rogerson assumes that the utility function is non–homothetic in that it has a subsistence
level of goods consumption. This turns out to be important for understanding relative hours
worked in Europe in the initial year of his study, 1956. At that time, Europe already had higher
tax rates than the US, yet they had higher hours of work. The non–homotheticity acts like a
negative income effect, and this effect is larger the lower is aggregate productivity. Given that
Europe lagged the US in aggregate productivity in 1956, this effect serves to increase hours in
49See Aguiar and Hurst (2007) and Ramey and Francis (2009) for evidence on the decline of home production
time in the US.
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Europe relative to the US. Additionally, because the model generates structural transformation,
Europe devoted more labor to goods production than the US in 1956. Because there are fewer
non–market substitutes for goods, this effect also serves to increase the amount of time devoted
to market work.
In related work, Ngai and Pissarides (2008) add a home production sector to their earlier
model of structural transformation that we have discussed above, Ngai and Pissarides (2007).
They showed that over time the model with home production generates a shallow u–shaped
curve for hours devoted to market work, and that it leads to the marketization of home produc-
tion, i.e., the movement of time out of home production and into market production of services.
Both of these patterns are found in the US data. The initial decrease in market work is associ-
ated with the movement of activity into services, which have better home produced substitutes.
But as time advances, a higher rate of growth in the productivity of market produced services
relative to home produced services leads to the movement of activity out of the home sector and
into the market sector, which results in the increase in market hours.
Another dramatic trend in labor market outcomes has been the rise of female labor force
participation. Several authors have argued that the process of structural transformation is an
important factor in accounting for this change. The basic idea is that jobs in the goods sector
(i.e., agriculture and manufacturing) and the service sector tend to have different weights on
various dimensions of labor input. In particular, the goods sector places more emphasis on
“brawn” while the service sector places more emphasis on “brains”. If men and women have
different relative endowments of these two factors, then the movement of activity from one
sector to the other could plausibly affect the desire of women to seek employment in the market
sector. Fuchs (1968) noted this explanation for the rise of female labor force participation.50
Rendall (2010) builds a two–sector model in which she can quantitatively evaluate the dif-
ference between men and women and argues that structural transformation is an important
quantitative factor in accounting for the rise of female labor force participation. In related
work, Akbulut (2011) also argues that the rise of the service sector has been an important factor
50Galor and Weil (1996) also note the changing demands for brain and brawn, though not in the specific context
of structural transformation. See also the papers by Goldin ( 1995, 2006) for additional analysis of the evolution
of female labor force participation patterns.
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in accounting for the rise of female labor force participation in the US, but the key reallocation
in her model is the movement of labor out of home produced services and into market produced
services in response to a more rapid rate of technological progress in market services relative
to home produced services.
Olivetti (2012) provides evidence from a large sample of developed and developing coun-
tries that connects the u–shaped profile for female labor force participation to structural trans-
formation, extending the earlier work by Goldin (1995). Specifically, she finds that as countries
develop, the share of women who work in agriculture relative to all working women decreases
faster than the share of men who work in agriculture relative to all working men, the share of
women who work in services increases faster than the share of men, and the share of women
who work in manufacturing remains flatter than the share of men.
7.5 Structural Transformation and Business Cycles
There are many different ways in which theories of structural transformation and business cycles
might overlap. One idea which frequently recurs is that some business cycles are the result
of periods of greater reallocation of economic activity across sectors. To the extent that this
reallocation of activity occurs at the broad sectoral level emphasized by models of structural
transformation, structural transformation and business cycles could be intimately related.
Using the search model of Lucas and Prescott (1974) as a reference point, Lilien (1982)
argued that if it takes time for labor to move from one sector to another, then periods of above
average reallocation will also be periods of above average unemployment. He then argued that
business cycles in the post World War II US were characterized as periods of above average
reallocation of labor among two–digit sectors, as measured by the variance in employment
growth rates at the two sector level. However, subsequent work by Abraham and Katz (1986)
argued that Lilien’s statistical finding about changes in the variance of sectoral growth rates
could simply be due to the fact that sectors vary in their response to aggregate shocks, and that
data on vacancies supported this latter explanation over the sectoral shifts explanation.
The idea of Lilien (1982) has experienced a recent resurgence in popularity in the face
of the current recession, with various economists suggesting that “mismatch” is an important
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element of the current high level of unemployment, and that the decline of broad sectors such
as manufacturing and construction is an important element of this mismatch. However, despite
its popularity, recent empirical research by Sahin et al. (2011) and Herz and van Rens (2011)
finds little evidence for this explanation.
We note that even if reallocation were concentrated during recessions, it would not follow
that recessions are caused by the reallocation. Rather, it may be that recessions are caused by
a second factor, and that the decisions that lead to reallocation are made in such a way that
reallocation coincides with the recession. That is, for example, it may be that steel mills go out
of business permanently during recessions, but this may simply reflect that the optimal timing
of exit for a steel mill is during a downturn in economic activity. Rogerson (1991) argued
that movement out of agriculture in the US has been concentrated during upturns in economic
activity, whereas the movement of workers out of manufacturing has been concentrated during
downturns.
Even if structural transformation is not the cause of business cycles, it may still exert an in-
fluence on business cycles. For example, to the extent that value added varies in volatility across
sectors, the sectoral composition of aggregate output is a potentially important determinant of
business cycle fluctuations. In what follows, we mention two examples of this idea.
The first example is Da Rocha and Restuccia (2006), who disaggregate the economy into
agriculture and non–agriculture and document that indeed there are important differences be-
tween the two sectors. In particular, they find that the agricultural sector is more volatile than the
rest of the economy, is not correlated with the rest of the economy, and has counter–cyclical em-
ployment. They show that this implies that countries with a larger agricultural sector have more
volatile aggregate output and less volatile employment. Moreover, it implies that as structural
transformations out of agriculture occur, business cycle properties across countries converge.
The second example of how the sectoral composition matters is due to Carvalho and Gabaix
(2013) and Moro (2012). They disaggregate the economy into services and manufacturing,
largely ignoring agriculture. They document that the volatility of services is lower than in
manufacturing. Moro (2012) argues that the reason for this is that the share of intermediate
inputs is larger in manufacturing than in services. Irrespective of why the volatilities differ
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between the two sectors, the implication is that the volatility of aggregate output declines as the
share of services increases along the path of structural transformation. Carvalho and Gabaix
(2013) find that this accounts for most of the “great moderation” and its recent undoing. In
particular, the great moderation is due to a decreasing share of manufacturing between 1975
and 1985, and its recent undoing in the form of rising aggregate volatility is due to the increase
of the size of the financial sector.
7.6 Structural Transformation and Wage Inequality
One of the dramatic secular changes in the US economy over the last fifty years has been the
marked increase in wage inequality that is associated with the return to skill. In a recent paper,
Buera and Kaboski (2012a) argue that this rising return to skill is intimately connected to the
structural transformation of economic activity towards services. They document in time series
data the same threshold behavior of value added in services that we have found above, that is,
there is a threshold for per capita income at which one observes an acceleration in the increase
in the value added share for services. Interestingly, at that threshold there is also an increase in
the fraction of the workforce that becomes skilled and of the skill premium. In the context of
the US they also document that the entire rise in the service sector’s share of value added in the
last fifty years is accounted for by growth in sub–sectors that have higher than average shares of
skilled labor. They go on to build a model that links these patterns as the outcome of structural
transformation that is driven by neutral productivity growth.
We previously described some general features of the framework that they use. Relative to
our earlier discussion, the key modification in this paper is that there are two types of labor:
skilled and unskilled. Skilled labor is specialized to a particular service, is costly to acquire and
is subject to an increasing cost curve. To capture the fact that home production is necessarily
less specialized, they assume that skilled labor is equivalent to unskilled labor in home produc-
tion. Services differ in “complexity”, where complexity captures both the amount of labor that
is required to produce them and the relative productivity advantage of skilled labor in producing
the service.
As the economy develops it produces services that are increasingly complex, thereby creat-
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ing additional incentives for both market production of wants and skill accumulation. Because
there is an upward sloping supply curve for skilled workers, the skill premium is also increas-
ing. The structure of their model is such that the relative advantage of skilled labor in producing
more complex services only emerges beyond a critical threshold level of complexity, so that
these patterns also emerge beyond a threshold. A key fact that this model is able to account
for that our benchmark model cannot is that this model predicts that the share of services in
nominal value added is flat below some threshold.
An important implication of this work is that adding the different roles of human capital in
various activities is an important ingredient in understanding some key features of structural
transformation.
8 Conclusion
Our goal in this chapter has been to summarize the basic facts about structural transformation,
and to present simple versions of the growth model that serve as the benchmark models being
used to organize our thinking about these facts. Much of the early literature has focused on try-
ing to identify multi–sector versions of the growth model that can generate structural transfor-
mation while simultaneously generating balanced growth. While the search for specifications
that can simultaneously yield structural transformation at the sectoral level and balanced growth
have proven to be useful in organizing research, we believe that focusing on frameworks that
yield exact balanced growth is probably overly restrictive. The literature should instead focus
on building models that can quantitatively account for the properties of structural transforma-
tion and in the process assess the importance of various economic mechanisms. We use this
concluding section to highlight what we view as important priorities for future research in this
area.
While we have a substantial amount of data regarding the process of structural transfor-
mation in today’s advanced economies, it would be good to know more about the nature of
structural transformation in today’s less developed economies. To what extent are they follow-
ing different paths from today’s developed economies? And if so, what are the factors that give
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rise to these differences?
Two economies of particular current interest in this regard are China and India, both because
of their size and because they have been experiencing very rapid growth. What role does struc-
tural transformation play in these countries’ growth? Dekle and Vandenbroucke (2012) have
studied structural transformation in China during 1978–2003. They have found that differential
sectoral productivity growth and the reduction of the relative size of the Chinese government
caused most of the structural transformation, but that mobility frictions (like the hukou system)
slowed the movement out of agriculture. Rubina (2012) has studied structural transformation
in India during 1980–2005. Contrary to the patterns that we have documented above, she has
found that TFP growth was fastest in services. Moreover, she has found that a three–sector
model can account for changes in sectoral value added but not in employment shares.
The growth miracle episode in South Korea has also attracted recent attention, specifically
as it relates to the issue of openness, structural transformation and growth. Betts et al. (2011),
Sposi (2011), and Teignier (2012) have studied structural transformation in South Korea during
its growth miracle. They argue that international trade accelerated the transition out of agricul-
ture into industry and services. Teignier (2012) argues in addition that international trade could
have played an even larger role if South Korea had not simultaneously introduced agricultural
protection policies.
U¨ngo¨r (2011) has compared Latin America with East Asia. He has found that differences
in sectoral productivity growth rates account well for the different sectoral reallocations in the
two regions, and in particular for the fact that Latin America has moved much more slowly out
of agriculture.
We think that more quantitative case studies of structural transformation in currently poor
countries will help to sharpen our understanding of the forces behind structural transformation
in such countries. Additionally, we think it will be useful to think about the factors that in-
fluence productivity growth. Virtually all of the literature on structural transformation takes
productivity changes as given, and effectively considers the implications of the exogenously
given paths for productivity on the process of structural transformation. But if the paths of
productivity differ significantly across countries, then it is important to ask what factors are
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responsible for these differences? If the differences are more pronounced in particular sectors
in particular countries, what are the factors that account for this? Is it policies that influence
the diffusion of technology, or perhaps policies that generate misallocation of inputs across
producers?
Moving forward, we also think it will be useful to refine the standard three–sector focus of
the literature. As today’s advanced economies are increasingly dominated by services, it will
be important to distinguish between different activities within services. For example, education
and health care are very different activities than retail trade, in that they both represent an invest-
ment and tend to use very different skill intensities for the labor that they employ. The work of
Jorgenson and Timmer (2011) and Duarte and Restuccia (2012) is a first step in this direction.
Using data from EU KLEMS, Jorgenson and Timmer (2011) document for the European Union,
Japan, and the US that there is substantial heterogeneity among services. Personal, finance, and
business services have low productivity growth and increasing shares in employment and GDP
whereas distribution services have rapid productivity growth and constant shares. Using data
from the International Comparison Program 2005, Duarte and Restuccia (2012) study for a large
cross section of countries the difference between traditional and non–traditional services where
traditional services comprise mostly non–market services such as domestic and household ser-
vices, education, health, and housing and non–traditional services comprise communication
and transport services, insurance and financial services, and recreational and cultural services.
For traditional services, they find that the relative price increases and the real expenditure share
decreases with income whereas for non–traditional services they find the opposite. An impor-
tant task for future work is to build models that are consistent with these facts and to explore to
implications that these models have for structural transformation and for aggregate outcomes.
There are many issues that we have not addressed or only touched upon in passing. One
such issue is the role that human capital plays in the process of structural transformation. Buera
and Kaboski (2012a) emphasize the fact that effectively all of the growth in the service sector in
the US in the post WW II period occurs in high skill services. While they emphasized the role
of human capital in the movement of resources from the goods producing sector to the service
sector, it is also plausible that human capital may be important in understanding the movement
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of workers between the agricultural sector and the non–agricultural sector. In fact, the work
by Caselli and Coleman (2001) that we described earlier is one paper that emphasized the role
that human capital plays in this part of the structural transformation process. Recent work by
Herrendorf and Schoellman (2012) provides additional evidence on this point. Using the CPS,
they document for the US that wages per hour are considerably higher in non–agriculture than
in agriculture. They show that this is accounted for by two main facts: non–agricultural workers
are positively selected in that they have more years of schooling; the returns to schooling and
experience are higher in non–agriculture. An open question is to what extent similar findings
hold in poorer countries than the US. In a recent paper, Lagakos and Waugh (2013) argue that
accounting for the heterogeneous quality of labor across sectors is important in understanding
the fact that poor countries seem to be have particularly low labor productivity in agriculture.
Another issue that we have not addressed is the role of industrial policy, broadly conceived.
Specifically, we have chosen to discipline the analysis by assuming sectoral production func-
tions with constant returns to scale and by abstracting from spillovers or externalities. As a
result, we have interpreted structural transformation as a feature of the efficient equilibrium
path, implying that there is no meaningful role for government policy. While our model frame-
work can be used to understand how particular policies might distort the allocation of resources
across sectors, there is no positive prescription for policy.
There is a sizeable literature that discusses structural transformation when there are increas-
ing returns to scale and the equilibrium path is inefficient; see Matsuyama (2008) for specific
references. The typical assumption in this literature is that non–agricultural production is sub-
ject to increasing returns, which accrue at the sectoral level, perhaps as the result of learning
by doing, and which are not taken into account by households and firms. Multiple steady
states then arise naturally and initial conditions determine the equilibrium path, and in partic-
ular whether the economy ends up in a “poverty trap”, that is, a steady state with low GDP
per capita and the majority of the labor force in agriculture. These types of models suggest
that policy may provide the “big push” that lets the economy escape from its poverty trap and
leads to industrialization and self–sustaining economic growth. We have not discussed this
theoretical possibility in more detail above because the empirical evidence on the success of
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“big–push” policies in particular, and industrial policies more generally, is mixed at best. But
more generally, the extent to which externalities, public goods, market power, or other factors
associated with inefficient equilibrium outcomes shape the process of structural transformation
remains largely unresolved.
92
Appendix A: Data Sources and Sector Assignments
Historical data 1800–2008
• Data source: GDP per capita at international dollars
◦ Data on GDP per capita at 1990 international dollars are from Maddison (2010) for
all countries and most years. There are some years in the early 19th century for
Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States when there
are data on value added and employment shares, but Maddison does not report data
on GDP per capita. We calculated GDP per capita at international dollars for these
years in the following way. From alternative sources, we first calculated real GDP
per capita for the missing years and for the first year for which Maddison’s data is
available. We then calculated the growth rates between the missing years and the
first year for which the Maddison data is available. Lastly, we combined the growth
rates with the Maddison’s data to calculate the per capita GDP at international dol-
lars for the missing years. Next we list the data sources for these calculations.
1. Belgium. 1835–1845: real GDP from Groningen Growth and Development
Centre, Historical National Accounts Database 2009, and population from Mad-
dison (2010).
2. Netherlands. 1807–1830: real GDP per capita from Smits et al. (2007).
3. Sweden. 1800–1820: real GDP per capita from Krantz and Schn (2007).
4. United Kingdom. 1800–1830: real GDP per capita from Clark (2009).
5. United States. Louis Johnston and Samuel H. Williamson, “What Was the U.S.
GDP Then?” MeasuringWorth, 2011.
• Data source: Value added at current prices
◦ Belgium. 1835–1990: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Historical Na-
tional Accounts Database 2009. 1991–2007: EU KLEMS 2009.
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◦ Spain. 1885–1940: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Historical Na-
tional Accounts Database 2009, 1953–2004: Groningen Growth and Development
Centre 10–sector Database 2007.
◦ Finland. 1860–2001: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Historical Na-
tional Accounts Database 2009.
◦ France. 1815–1938: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Historical Na-
tional Accounts Database 2009, 1950–1960: Mitchell (2007) Table J2, 1970–2005:
Groningen Growth and Development Centre 10–sector Database 2007.
◦ Japan. 1885–1940: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Historical Na-
tional Accounts Database 2009, 1953–2004: Groningen Growth and Development
Centre 10-sector Database 2007.
◦ Korea. 1911–1940: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Historical Na-
tional Accounts Database 2009, 1953–2005: Groningen Growth and Development
Centre 10–sector Database 2007.
◦ Netherlands. 1807–1913: Smits et al. (2007), 1970–2005: Groningen Growth and
Development Centre 10–sector database, August 2008.
◦ Sweden. 1800–2000: Krantz and Schn (2007), 2000–2005: Groningen Growth and
Development Centre 10-sector Database, August 2008.
◦ United Kingdom. 1801, 1941–1851: Broadberry et al. (2011) Table 8–9, 1811–
1831, 1860–1910, 1950: Mitchell (2007) Table J2, 1920–1938: Feinstein (1972) Ta-
ble 9, 1960–2005: Groningen Growth and Development Centre 10–sector Database
2007.
◦ United States. 1800–1900: Agriculture and Manufacturing, Gallman (1960), Ser-
vices, Gallman and Weiss (1969), 1909–1918: King (1930), 1919-1928: Kuznets et
al. (1941), 1929–1946: Carter et al., eds (2006) Table Ca35–53, 1947–2008: Value
Added by Industry, Gross Domestic Product by Industry Accounts, Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis.
• Data source: Employment
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◦ Belgium. 1846–1961: Mitchell (2007) Table B1, 1970–2007: EU KLEMS 2009.
◦ Spain. 1860–1964: Mitchell (2007) Table B1, 1970–2007: EU KLEMS 2009.
◦ Finland. 1805–1960: Mitchell (2007) Table B1, 1970–2007: EU KLEMS 2009.
◦ France. 1856–1968: Mitchell (2007) Table B1, 1970–2007: EU KLEMS 2009.
◦ Korea. 1953–2005: Groningen Growth and Development Centre 10–sector Database
2007.
◦ Netherlands. 1807–1913: Smits et al. (2007), 1920–1947: Mitchell (2007) Table
B1, 1970–2005: Groningen Growth and Development Centre 10–sector Database
2008.
◦ Sweden. 1850–2000: Krantz and Schn (2007), 2000–2005: Groningen Growth and
Development Centre 10–sector Database 2008.
◦ United Kingdom. 1801, 1813–1820 average assigned to 1817, 1851: Broadberry
et al. (2011) Table 1 and Table 12, 1841: Mitchell (2007) Table B1, 1861–1938:
Feinstein (1972) Table 59–60, 1948–2005: Groningen Growth and Development
Centre 10–sector Database 2007.
◦ United States. 1840–1920: Carter et al., eds (2006) Table Ba814–830, 1929–2008:
NIPA Table 6.8 Persons Engaged in Production, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
• Sector assignments
1. Agriculture corresponds to the sum of International Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion (ISIC) sections A–B. If ISIC classification was not available, we assigned in-
dustries to agriculture if the source table heading said “Agriculture” or “Agriculture,
forestry and fishing”
2. Manufacturing corresponds to the sum of ISIC sections C, D, F and includes min-
ing, manufacturing, and construction. If ISIC classification was not available, we
assigned industries to manufacturing if the source table heading said “Mining” or
“Extractive industries” or “Manufacturing” or “Construction” or “Electricity, Gas
and Water Supply” or “Utilities”.
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3. Services correspond to the sum of ISIC sections E, G–P and include utilities, whole-
sale, retail trade, hotels and restaurants, transport, storage and communication, fi-
nance, insurance, real estate, business services, and community social and personal
services. If ISIC classification was not available, we assigned industries to services
if the source table heading said “Commerce” or “Finance” or “Trade” or “Trans-
port” or “Communication” or “Services”
EU KLEMS 2009
• Data sources (EU KLEMS series code in brackets)
1. Employment
◦ Total hours worked by persons engaged in millions (H EMP)
2. Value added
◦ Gross value added at current basic prices (VA)
• Sector assignment
1. Agriculture corresponds to the sum of International Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion (ISIC) sections A–B.
2. Manufacturing corresponds to the sum of ISIC sections C, D, F and includes mining,
manufacturing, and construction.
3. Services correspond to the sum of ISIC sections E, G–P and includes utilities,
wholesale, retail trade, hotels and restaurants, transport, storage and communica-
tion, finance, insurance, real estate, business services, and community social and
personal services.
World Development Indicators 2010
• Data sources (WDI series code in brackets)
1. Employment
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◦ Employment in agriculture (% of total employment) (SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS)
◦ Employment in industry (% of total employment) (SL.IND.EMPL.ZS)
◦ Employment in services (% of total employment) (SL.SRV.EMPL.ZS)
2. Value added
◦ Agriculture, value added as % of GDP) (NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS)
◦ Industry, value added as % of GDP) (NV.IND.TOTL.ZS)
◦ Services, etc., value added as % of GDP (NV.SRV.TETC.ZS)
• Oil production
1. Oil rents as % of GDP, (NY.GDP.PETR.RT.ZS)
• Sector assignment
1. Agriculture corresponds to the sum of ISIC divisions 1–5 and includes forestry,
hunting, and fishing, as well as the cultivation of crops and livestock production.
2. Manufacturing corresponds to the category “Industry” in the WDI, which is the
sum of ISIC divisions 10–45 and includes mining, manufacturing, construction,
electricity, water, and gas.
3. Services correspond to the sum of ISIC divisions 50–99 and include value added in
wholesale and retail trade (including hotels and restaurants), transport, and govern-
ment, financial, professional, and personal services (such as education), health care,
and real estate services. They also include imputed bank service charges, import
duties, and statistical discrepancies as well as discrepancies arising from rescaling.
National Accounts of the United Nations Statistics Division
• Data sources
1. Gross value added by economic activity at current prices in national currency
• Sector assignment
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1. Agriculture corresponds ISIC sections A–B.
2. Manufacturing corresponds to the sum of ISIC sections C–F and includes mining,
manufacturing, utilities, and construction.
3. Services correspond to the sum of ISIC sections G–P and includes wholesale, retail
trade, hotels and restaurants, transport, storage and communication, finance, insur-
ance, real estate, business services, and community social and personal services.
Historical Consumption Shares UK and US
• Data source: GDP per capita at international dollars at 1990 international dollars are from
Maddison (2010)
• Data source: US Consumption share in current prices
◦ 1900–1928: Carter et al., eds (2006)
◦ 1929–2008: BEA
• Data source: UK Consumption share in current prices
◦ 1900–1964: Feinstein (1972)
◦ 1965–2008: Office of National Statistics (ONS)
Penn World Tables
• Data source: PWT6.3 (PWT series code in brackets)
1. Real Gross Domestic Product per Capita Relative to the United States (G-K method,
current price) (y)
2. Real GDP per capita in constant prices: chain series (rgdpch)
3. Real GDP per worker in constant prices: chain series (rgdpwok)
4. Population (pop)
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• Data source: PWT benchmark 1980
◦ Sector assignment
1. Agriculture corresponds to the sum of PWT80 items 1–50
2. Manufacturing corresponds to the sum of PWT80 items 51–54, 56–58, 63–66,
68–78, 81–83, 91–93, 95–97, 103–108, 112-113, 118-122
3. Services correspond to the sum of PWT items 55, 59–62, 67, 79-80, 84–90, 94,
98–102, 109–111, 114–118, 123–125
• Data source: PWT benchmark 1985
◦ Sector assignment
1. Agriculture corresponds to the sum of PWT80 items 1–41
2. Manufacturing corresponds to the sum of PWT80 items 42–47, 49–51, 56–61,
63–68, 70–72, 75–77, 82–84, 86–87, 94–97, 101, 107-109
3. Services correspond to the sum of PWT items 48, 52–55, 62, 69, 73–74, 78–81,
85, 88–93, 98–100, 102–106
• Data source: PWT benchmark 1996
◦ Sector assignment
1. Agriculture corresponds to bread and cereals, meat, fish, milk, cheese and eggs,
oils and fats, fruit, vegetables and potatoes, other food, non-alcoholic bever-
ages, alcoholic beverages.
2. Manufacturing corresponds to tobacco, clothing including repairs, footwear in-
cluding repairs, fuel and power, furniture, floor coverings and repairs, other
household goods incl. household textiles, household appliances and repairs,
personal transportation equipment.
3. Services correspond to gross rent and water charges, medical and health ser-
vices, operation of transportation equipment, purchased transport services, com-
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munication, recreation and culture, education, restaurants, cafes and hotels,
other goods and services.
OECD Consumption Expenditure Data
• Data source:
◦ Final consumption expenditure of households, national currency, current prices,
OECD National Accounts Statistics. This data set includes the final consumption
expenditure of households broken down by the COICOP (Classification of Individ-
ual Consumption According to Purpose) classification and by durability.
• Sector assignment (COICOP codes in brackets)
1. Food: “Food and non–alcoholic beverages” (P31CP010)
2. Manufactured goods: “Durable goods” plus “Semi–durable goods” plus “Non–
durable goods” minus “Food and non–alcoholic beverages” (P311B+P312B+P313B-
P31CP010)
3. Services: Services (P314B)
• Construction of the data for E7 countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy,
Netherlands, United Kingdom) for the period 1980–2009. Consumption expenditure data
are from the National Accounts of Eurostat both in local currency and euro. Then, for
each year and each country, a conversion rate between local currency and euro was cal-
culated by dividing total consumption expenditures in local currency with total consump-
tion expenditures in euros. The three expenditure items expressed in local currency were
converted into euros using this conversion rate, and then they were aggregated.
Real GDP per capita at 1990 international $
• Prior to 1970 the data on GDP per capita at 1990 international dollars are from Maddison
(2010) for all years and countries if it was available,
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• After 1970 we constructed real GDP per capita at 1990 international $ in the following
ways. The data on GDP per capita at 1990 international dollars for the United States
were taken from Maddison (2010). The real GDP per capita of the United States was
multiplied by the data on real GDP per capita relative to the United States to calculate the
real GDP per capita at 1990 international $ for each country and each year.
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Appendix B: Panel Regressions
To get a balanced panel, we only include countries with data over the entire period 1970–2007.
In addition, we restrict the sample in three ways: we exclude countries in which the average
ratio of oil rent to GDP exceeds 20% during 1970–2007;51 we exclude countries with average
populations of fewer than a million during 1970–2007; we exclude the former communist coun-
tries. The reason for these exclusion criteria is that the sector composition in these countries
may be distorted. This leaves 103 countries.
Table 1: Panel Data Analysis Agriculture, 1970–2007
Dependent variable:
Agricultural share in value added
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log GDP per capita −0.121∗∗ −0.489∗∗ 0.450∗ −0.126∗∗ −0.396∗∗ 0.169
(0.001) (0.021) (0.184) (0.015) (0.067) (0.274)
(log GDP per capita)2 0.022∗∗ −0.096∗∗ 0.017∗∗ −0.056
(0.001) (0.022) (0.004) (0.035)
(log GDP per capita)3 0.005∗∗ 0.003∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Country fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.751 0.783 0.786 0.751 0.781 0.784
N 3914 3914 3914 3914 3914 3914
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are
indicated by † p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
51The oil–rent–to–GDP ratio is taken from the WDI.
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Table 2: Panel Data Analysis Manufacturing, 1970–2007
Dependent variable:
Manufacturing share in value added
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log GDP per capita 0.043∗∗ 0.447∗∗ −1.196∗∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.497∗∗ −1.252∗∗
(0.001) (0.021) (0.144) (0.017) (0.078) (0.446)
(log GDP per capita)2 −0.025∗∗ 0.182∗∗ −0.028∗∗ 0.198∗∗
(0.001) (0.018) (0.005) (0.058)
(log GDP per capita)3 −0.009∗∗ −0.009∗∗
(0.001) (0.002)
R2 0.234 0.331 0.352 0.234 0.331 0.348
N 3914 3914 3914 3914 3914 3914
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are
indicated by † p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 3: Panel Data Analysis Services, 1970–2007
Dependent variable:
Service share in value added
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log GDP per capita 0.078∗∗ 0.041∗ 0.745∗∗ 0.072∗∗ −0.101 1.084∗
(0.001) (0.019) (0.170) (0.012) (0.089) (0.417)
(log GDP per capita)2 0.002∗ −0.086∗∗ 0.011† −0.142∗
(0.001) (0.021) (0.006) (0.055)
(log GDP per capita)3 0.004∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.001) (0.002)
R2 0.493 0.493 0.496 0.493 0.485 0.476
N 3914 3914 3914 3914 3914 3914
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are
indicated by † p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
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